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*

Judicial and scholarly assessment of emerging technology seems poised to
drive the Fourth Amendment down one of three paths. The first would simply
relegate the amendment to a footnote in history books by limiting its reach
to harms that the framers specifically envisioned. A modified version of this first
approach would dispense with expansive constitutional notions of privacy and
replace them with legislative fixes. A third path offers the amendment continued
vitality but requires the U.S. Supreme Court to overhaul its Fourth Amendment
analysis. Fortunately, a fourth alternative is available to cabin emerging technologies within the existing doctrinal framework. Analysis of satellite-based
tracking illustrates this last approach.
The Global Positioning System (GPS) allows law enforcement officials to
monitor an individual’s precise movements for weeks or months at a time. GPS
technology not only is substantially different than anything the Court has
previously considered, but also is a substantial threat to fundamental notions
of privacy. By illustrating how, with only minor tweaking, existing Fourth
Amendment law can effectively rein in intrusive applications of this one emerging
technology, this Article begins to construct an analytical framework that
can be applied more broadly to future technological enhancements.
This Article begins by reviewing the science and capabilities of GPSenhanced surveillance. It concludes that satellite-based tracking is a powerful
investigative tool that enables authorities to monitor the movements (both
indoors and out) of an unlimited number of people for weeks or months at
a time. This Article then examines the Court’s historical treatment of technologically enhanced surveillance, and shows that the intrusiveness of an emerging
technology is critical to its constitutional treatment. Considering the intrusiveness
of GPS-enhanced tracking, this Article concludes that the unfettered use of such
surveillance is inimical to fundamental Fourth Amendment principles. The most
defensible treatment of GPS tracking under the existing analytical framework
is that it is a search and, as such, must be preauthorized by a warrant issued
only upon probable cause.
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INTRODUCTION
There is an electronic record of where I buy my coffee each morning.
If anyone cared to, they could determine with a simple Internet search all
of the places I have lived in the last decade; whether I rented or owned;
how much I paid for each house I bought; and how much I made when I
sold it. My local library keeps an electronic file of all the books I have
ever borrowed, and my school keeps a similar database. The online vendor
where I occasionally order clothing for my children keeps track of my
buying preferences (and my children’s sizes) to “assist” me in making
future purchases. My local grocery store is kind enough to offer the same
service—registering and indexing a list of every item I have ever
purchased as part of the store’s frequent shopper program. Consequently, my grocer knows that I have pets; that my kids are no longer
in diapers; and that someone in the house is eating a lot of chicken
nuggets. Along certain parts of my daily route, surveillance cameras
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silently record my passing image, presumptively for my own safety.
Indeed, even communications with colleagues, family, and friends are
subject to review by any adequately motivated member of my Internet
provider’s tech staff. The degree of monitoring I am subject to is
staggering, and this is all without (as far as I know) being suspected of
any wrongdoing.
I do not mean to suggest that the sky is falling. It’s not. But, one
cannot escape the conclusion that technological advancements now
enable substantial encroachments into zones formerly deemed wholly
personal. This reality, though, does not augur an end to privacy in
every sense. Though the necessities of modern life may at times
require the disclosure of discrete portions of our daily routine to the
handful of private parties that provide us with services, it is unlikely
most Americans would sanction pervasive monitoring by our government.1 If we are to avoid the Orwellian predictions of some conspiracy
theorists, we must find meaningful ways to limit the government’s ability
to keep tabs on us. The Fourth Amendment is our first line of defense.
The Fourth Amendment provides, in part, that the “right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”2 Currently,
two primary schools of thought exist with regard to the protection this
language offers against the government’s use of emerging technologies
to conduct searches.
In the first camp are those who argue that, by design, the amendment
has very little continuing relevance. For this camp, legislative remedies are
the better course if we wish to vigorously protect our privacy against

1.
Admittedly, the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that “when an individual
reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal
that information to the authorities.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984).
There is much that is objectionable about the Court’s use of the assumption of risk doctrine in
defining the scope of Fourth Amendment protection. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing that “to make risk analysis
dispositive in assessing the reasonableness of privacy expectations would allow the government to define the scope of Fourth Amendment protections”). However, in this
Article, I do not make the case for rejecting that doctrine. Rather, this Article assumes
for the sake of discussion that disclosure of discrete units of information to particular
private sources may somewhat undercut a privacy claim with regard to the disclosed units.
I nonetheless maintain that the aggregation of such information by a single government
source triggers Fourth Amendment concerns. For a fuller discussion, see infra note 244
and accompanying text.
2.
U.S. C ONST . amend. IV.
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enhanced governmental surveillance.3 A second camp rejects the notion
that the Fourth Amendment was not intended to operate in our modern,
high-tech society. The view of those in this camp is grounded in a belief
that underlying the Fourth Amendment is an expansive concern for the
protection of privacy. However, this second camp largely concludes that
the U.S. Supreme Court has so thoroughly bungled its interpretation of
the amendment that the best course is to simply begin the legal analysis
anew.4 In this Article, I suggest a somewhat different course that will
reclaim the relevance of the Fourth Amendment within the contours of
existing doctrine.
As a theoretical matter, it is difficult to plausibly argue that the Fourth
Amendment is not animated by a spirit of privacy protection that enjoys
continued significance. Consequently, while legislative remedies should
offer supplemental coverage, they are not a necessary stand-in for constitutional safeguards. It is also true that, as a matter of sheer pragmatism, it
is unlikely the Court will heed the call to wipe the jurisprudential slate
clean. Therefore, if the Fourth Amendment is to enjoy continued vitality
3.
Noted scholars have suggested that protection against invasive technologies should be
provided primarily by legislative enactment and not by the Fourth Amendment. See Orin
S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for
Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 806 (2004). However, at least with regard to Global Positioning
System (GPS) tracking, resort to legislative protections is, at this point, more aspiration than
reality. As an initial matter, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 governs the use of electronic monitoring devices. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2513, 2515–2522
(2000 & Supp. IV 2004). It regulates private as well as government conduct. Id. § 2511.
However, Title III does not apply to electronic transmitting devices that trace locations. Id.
§ 2510(12)(C). Only the Fourth Amendment regulates the use of this technology. See United
States v. Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753, 758–59 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Moreover, even if the provisions were interpreted to cover GPS tracking, Title I of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, the successor to Title III, regulates the use of
electronic surveillance for purposes of domestic law enforcement. See Pub. L. No. 99-508,
§§ 101–111, 100 Stat. 1848 (amending scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). The Act, in turn, looks
to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to define electronic surveillance. See
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii). FISA limits the definition of electronic surveillance to “the
installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device . . . under
circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would
be required for law enforcement purposes.” 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(4) (2000). Thus, until courts
determine that law enforcement’s use of GPS technology triggers the protections of the
Fourth Amendment, the protections afforded by Title I would arguably remain inapplicable.
See also 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2000).
4.
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757,
759 (1994) (“Fourth Amendment case law is a sinking ocean liner—rudderless and badly off
course—yet most scholarship contents itself with rearranging the deck chairs.”); Stephen A.
Saltzburg, The Fourth Amendment: Internal Revenue Code or Body of Principles?, 74 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 956, 1018 (2006) (“Fourth Amendment law resembles the Internal Revenue Code in its
complexity. It need not. A principled approach to the Fourth Amendment remains an option.”).
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in practice and not just theory, we must find ways to reclaim its relevance
within the existing constitutional framework.
This Article takes a significant step toward that goal by identifying
one emerging technology, and demonstrating that the Fourth Amendment,
as currently interpreted by the Court, provides a meaningful check on law
enforcement’s use of that technology. By illustrating how existing Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence can effectively rein in the use of one emerging
technology, I hope to begin constructing an analytical framework that can
be broadly applied to challenged searches generally.
The technology analyzed in this Article is the Global Positioning
System (GPS). GPS-enabled surveillance allows a single person to remotely
(and simultaneously) monitor the movements of one or more individuals
for limitless periods or to determine their precise location at any moment.5
Because it enables the tracking of individuals more accurately and with
fewer resources, GPS-enhanced surveillance is rapidly becoming a staple of
police investigations.6 For example, in the State of Washington, the police
used a GPS-enhanced tracking device to surreptitiously monitor a suspect’s
every move for nearly a month before his eventual arrest.7 However, despite its
tendency to erode privacy, the Supreme Court has yet to consider whether there
are any constitutional bounds upon law enforcement’s use of the technology.
Part I of this Article provides an analysis of the science behind GPSenhanced tracking technology and discusses its capabilities, both current
and future. Part II then examines the Supreme Court’s development of
Fourth Amendment doctrine as it relates to enhanced surveillance methods.
Part III considers the capabilities of GPS technology through the lens of
this existing case law, and determines that while there are admittedly
significant differences between GPS-enabled tracking and other previously
considered forms of enhanced surveillance,8 those differences can be addressed
within the basic analytical framework that the Supreme Court has established.
The Article determines that the Court’s existing decisions require Fourth
5.
See infra Part I for a full discussion of the functioning of GPS as a system that can be
used for enhanced surveillance.
6.
See, e.g., NAT’L WORKRIGHTS INST., ON YOUR TRACKS: GPS TRACKING IN THE
WORKPLACE 6 (2004), http://www.workrights.org/issue_electronic/NWI_GPS_Report.pdf.
7.
State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 220–21 (Wash. 2003) (reflecting that a GPS device
secretly and continuously monitored the location of the suspect’s truck from October 26,
1999, until November 13, 1999).
8.
See, e.g., id. at 221, 223–24. The technological precursor to GPS, the beeper, is a
battery-operated device that emits a weak radio signal that can be followed using a receiver.
Beepers do not provide pinpointed targeting of suspects and do not permit the remote
tracking of targets.
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Amendment protection in the form of a warrant in light of the sheer volume
of information revealed by GPS-enabled tracking.9

I.

THE SCIENCE AND USES OF GPS

Global positioning is a satellite-based technology that reveals informa10
tion about the location, speed, and direction of a targeted subject. While
it was initially developed for the U.S. military, countless civilian applications of GPS appear in the marketplace, including cellular telephones and
onboard navigation systems in automobiles.11 Alongside the growing acceptance by consumers, law enforcement has recently begun to employ the
technology to track criminal suspects.12
The U.S. Department of Defense developed the Navigational Satellite
Timing and Ranging Global Positioning System in the 1970s.13 Known
alternately as “Navstar” or “GPS” technology, it was formally launched in 1978,
when Rockwell International sent into orbit the first of eleven satellites built
for the project.14 These eleven satellites, which were known as the Block I
satellites, are no longer in use.15 However, in 1989, the government began
launching the second generation of satellites. By March 1994, twentyfour Block II satellites were fully operational and controlling the
system.16 Twenty-nine GPS satellites are currently in orbit and have
been since 2005.17 Moreover, a recent Department of Defense report
9.
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001); United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276, 283–84 (1983).
10.
See, e.g., DEF. SCI. BD. TASK FORCE, DEP’T OF DEF., THE FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL
POSITIONING SYSTEM 4, 25–26 (2005), http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2005-10-GPS_
Report_Final.pdf.
11.
NAT’L WORKRIGHTS INST., supra note 6, at 5.
12.
Id. at 6.
13.
See Alan Zeichick, GPS Explained: How the Global Positioning System Lets You Know Where You
Stand, RED HERRING, Jan. 30, 2001, at 80, available at http://www.redherring.com/Article.aspx?a=790#
(article may be accessed through a free subscription). Alan Zeichick is a technology analyst at
Camden Associates and is the editor-in-chief of BZ Media’s SD Times.
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
16.
SCOTT PACE ET AL., RAND CORP., THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM: ASSESSING
NATIONAL POLICIES, app. B at 243–46 (1995), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_
reports/MR614/.
17.
Apart from the now defunct Block I satellites, there are five generations of satellites currently in
existence (though not all in orbit). They are the Block II and Block IIA, which were manufactured by
Rockwell International; the Block IIR and Block IIR-M, which were manufactured by Lockheed-Martin;
and the Block IIF, which were manufactured by Boeing. In early 2005, the GPS constellation consisted
of one Block II satellite, fifteen Block IIA satellites, and twelve Block IIR satellites. In December
2005, a Block IIR-M was added to the group. DEF. SCI. BD. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 44–45.

Tied Up in Knotts?

415

recommended an increase in the number of satellites to ensure even
greater operability and accuracy of GPS.18
19
GPS transmits two types of information. The first is encrypted
20
information for military use. The second is unencrypted information for
21
Until May 2000, the information sent in the civilian
civilian use.
transmission was intentionally riddled with random errors.22 These errors
served to reduce the accuracy of the information transmitted for civilian
23
24
purposes. However, the government no longer includes these errors. Thus,
the current accuracy of the civilian system is, at least theoretically, as
good as the information transmitted along military channels.25
GPS allows a receiver on earth to “listen” to the transmissions of the
Navstar satellites.26 The satellites circle the earth along six prespecified
paths (or orbital planes), with a group of approximately four satellites
evenly spaced across each one of the paths.27 Each satellite continuously
transmits the position and orbital velocity of every satellite in the system.28
29
The collective information is known as the system’s ephemeris. A receiver
30
on earth then “listens” to the transmissions of the four closest satellites.
Each satellite’s transmission information defines a sphere around it, enabling
the receiver to determine where it may be in relation to each satellite.31
Based upon an overlay of the spheres, the receiver determines its precise
location on earth.32
One simple way to help visualize the technology is to imagine that
you are lost in New York City. You have a map of the city in your
hands, but you have no idea where on the map you are located. At just

18.
Id. at 9.
19.
See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. ET AL., 2005 FEDERAL RADIONAVIGATION PLAN 2-2 to 2-3
(2005), http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/pubs/frp2005/2005%20FRP%20WEB.pdf.
20.
Id.
21.
Id.
22.
See Statement by the President Regarding the United States’ Decision to Stop Degrading
Global Positioning System Accuracy, 1 P UB . PAPERS 803 (May 1, 2000).
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
Though the government in 2000 did away with the intentional random errors that were
introduced into the civilian transmission, in the event of a national emergency, it reserves the
right to selectively deny civilian access to the GPS signals being sent. Id.
26.
See Zeichick, supra note 13.
27.
DEF. SCI. BD. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 27; see also Zeichick, supra note 13.
28.
Zeichick, supra note 13.
29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
D EF. S CI. B D. T ASK F ORCE, supra note 10, at 28.
32.
Id.
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that moment, a friend calls. You describe your surroundings and she tells
you, “You are five blocks from Grand Central Station.” You pull out a
compass that you just happen to carry with you and draw a circle with a five
block radius around the Station. However, you immediately realize that
while the information your friend has given you narrows the universe of
places you might be, it still does not give you your precise location, because
you could be at any point on the boundary of the circle you have drawn33:

Grand
Central
Station

A second friend calls and tells you, “You are ten blocks from Madison
Square Garden.” Using your compass, you again draw an appropriately
sized circle around the Garden and realize that you can now substantially
narrow the range of possibilities for your current location to the two places
where the first circle and the second circle intersect:
A

•

Grand
Central
Station

Madison
Square Garden
•

B

A third friend then calls and tells you, “You are fifteen blocks from
Columbus Circle.” When you combine the information from this last call
with the information from the first two, you can narrow your location to
the place where the three circles intersect—the Port Authority Bus Terminal,
33.
Because New York City blocks tend to be longer from east to west than from north to
south, the five-block area surrounding Grand Central Station would look more like an oval
than a circle. But, for the sake of simplicity, I have described the bounded areas as circles.
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for it is simultaneously five blocks from Grand Central, ten blocks from
Madison Square Garden, and fifteen blocks from Columbus Circle:

Port Authority

Columbus
Circle

•

Madison
Square Garden

Grand
Central
Station

This process of calculating a single location using multiple linear
measures is known as trilateration.34 GPS receivers use trilateration in
three dimensions (based upon information received from four satellites) to
calculate their latitude, longitude, and altitude.35 In addition, a receiver can
compute its speed and the direction in which it is traveling by assessing
the rate of change in information received from the satellites. 36
Currently, the information transmitted from the GPS satellites allows
a basic receiver to accurately determine its position to within one or two
37
meters. However, using what is known as differential GPS (or DGPS), a
receiver can dramatically improve its positioning accuracy to pinpoint precision.38 DGPS positioning works in the same manner as GPS positioning

34.
Richard B. Langley, In Simple Terms, How Does GPS Work? (Jan. 6, 2006),
http://gge.unb.ca/Resources/HowDoesGPSWork.html.
35.
See Zeichick, supra note 13.
36.
PACE ET AL., supra note 16, app. A at 220.
37.
This increased accuracy is due to the augmentation of GPS with NDGPS, the
Nationwide Differential GPS, and WAAS, the Wide-Area Augmentation System. DEF. SCI. BD.
T ASK F ORCE, supra note 10, at 10, 40.
38.
P ACE ET AL., supra note 16, app. A at 227; see also DEF. SCI. BD. TASK FORCE, supra
note 10, at 89 (noting that accuracies of “better than [ten] centimeters” have been achieved in
civil applications).
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with one additional element.39 A known, fixed location is outfitted with a
receiver. Information from the fixed receiver is then compared to information from the roaming receiver.40 This comparison allows for minute
corrections of error, which, depending upon the type of receivers used, can
increase positioning accuracy to within centimeters.41
GPS is commonly referred to as a tracking system. However, this
mischaracterization of the technology actually undervalues the system’s
potential. GPS receivers are passive devices, simply reading the information
continuously transmitted by the orbiting satellites.42 Unless the receiver is
also outfitted with a wireless transmitter or recording device, only the
receiver can calculate its latitude, longitude, altitude, direction, and speed.
A remote third party could not determine the receiver’s location.43 The
passive nature of the system thus provides some comfort to those concerned
with the privacy implications of GPS technology. Such comfort, however,
is ill-founded.
The passive receipt of information enables GPS technology to support
an infinite number of receivers simultaneously. As one commentator has
noted, “GPS provides 24 hour per day global coverage. It is an all-weather
system and is not affected by rain, snow, fog, or sand storms.”44 Furthermore,
GPS receivers can be easily outfitted with wireless transmitters that send
location information to third parties.45 The third party can remotely
monitor the precise location of the GPS receiver from a tracking center. In
other words, the passive nature of the system makes its reach virtually
limitless, and the easy modification of receivers allows them to be quickly
converted into tracking devices.
As a result of these features, law enforcement has found the technology
to be a useful aid to criminal investigations. GPS technology allows
law enforcement officials to monitor suspects more successfully than
with ordinary visual surveillance.46 For example, the Los Angeles Police
Department recently announced that it has begun to outfit its cruisers
39.
PACE ET AL., supra note 16, app. A at 227.
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
42.
Langley, supra note 34.
43.
See id.
44.
Id.
45.
See State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 221 (Wash. 2003) (stating that the discovery of a
missing nine-year-old victim’s body was made possible by detailed information provided by a GPS
tracking device, which included identification of locations visited by the suspect’s truck and an
exact indication of the time the truck spent motionless at each location).
46.
See id.
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with air guns that can launch GPS-enabled “darts” at passing cars.47 The
darts consist of a miniaturized GPS receiver, radio transmitter, and battery
embedded in a sticky compound material. When fired at a vehicle, the
compound adheres to the target, and thereafter permits remote real-time
tracking of the target from police headquarters.48
The technology has also been used by some police departments to
conduct internal investigations of their own officers. For example, in
Clinton Township, New Jersey, the police department surreptitiously
installed GPS devices behind the grilles of its cruisers.49 A sergeant in
the department then secretly monitored the devices and caught five
officers lingering over lunch breaks and hanging out in parking lots at
times when they were supposed to be on patrol. 50
However, vehicular movements are far from the only thing that
can be monitored using GPS-enabled surveillance. The technology is
constantly becoming smaller and more efficient. For example, in an effort to
enhance emergency response times, GPS technology has become a standard
addition to most new model cellular telephones.51 The development of a
child-sized tracking bracelet was also recently announced to enable parents
to keep constant tabs on the precise location of their children.52 And
recently, a California company announced the launch of its latest GPS
device, which measures just 2.56 inches by 1.7 inches by 1.1 inches and
weighs just over three ounces.53 Small enough and light enough to be
47.
Richard Winton, LAPD Pursues High-Tech End to High-Speed Chases, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
3, 2006, at B1; LAPD to Chase GPS Darts, T ECHTREE , Feb. 4, 2006, http://www.techtree.com/
techtree/jsp/article.jsp?article_id=71159&cat_id=549.
48.
Winton, supra note 47, at B1; see also Posting of David Pescovitz to BoingBoing,
http://www.boingboing.net/2006/02/03/gpsenabled_dart.html (Feb. 3, 2006, 04:27:21 PM) (describing
GPS-enabled dart); StarChase, http://www.starchase.org (last visited Jan. 30, 2007) (official
website of the only current commercial provider of GPS-enabled dart technology).
49.
Brandon Bain, Workers Object to Babylon’s Tracking System, N EWSDAY , Mar. 13,
2006, at A6.
50.
Id.
51.
See James C. White, People, Not Places: A Policy Framework for Analyzing Location
Privacy Issues 1 (Spring 2003) (unpublished masters memo, Duke University), available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/location/jwhitelocationprivacy.pdf; see also NAT’L WORKRIGHTS INST.,
supra note 6, at 5.
52.
Dan Farmer & Charles C. Mann, Surveillance Nation, T ECH. R EV., Apr. 2003, at
34, 38.
53.
Compact GPS Tracks Footsteps Around the World, GPS WORLD, Jan. 2006, at 64, 64,
available at http://www.gpsworld.com/gpsworld/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=267159&searchString=
%22Compact%20GPS%20Tracks%20Footsteps%20around%20the%20World; see also Press Release,
Digital Angel Corp., Digital Angel Miniaturizes GPS Transmitting Technology: Matchbook-Size
Device Opens Way to Monitor People, Animals and Objects Anywhere (July 15, 2006), available
at http://www.digitalangelcorp.com/about_pressreleases.asp?RELEASE_ID=64.
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planted on a person, the device has the added technological advantage of
functioning well indoors. Though GPS devices historically functioned
best when they could “see” the sky, the technology has now advanced to
enable reliable indoor tracking as well.54
Moreover, the current state of the technology is constantly being
enhanced. In December 2005, the first of a modernized, second-generation
satellite (IIR-M) was launched and became fully operational.55 A second
satellite in this series is to be launched sometime in 2007, with a total of
eight IIR-M satellites ultimately scheduled for launch.56 Also, a new generation
of satellites—Block III—is currently in development and is scheduled
for launch in 2013.57 These satellites, which have a projected price tag
of $100 to $150 million apiece, will incorporate enhanced electronics, continuous contact capabilities, and antijamming technologies.58 In addition,
“all-in-view” receivers are currently in development. These receivers will
calculate their location based upon information received from all satellites
in view and not just the four closest.59 The new devices will further
60
increase efficiency and accuracy.
As noted, the basic accuracy of the current system is approximately
two meters (or roughly six and a half feet). However, the recently launched
European Galileo project will improve that figure by half. Once Galileo
becomes fully operational, the system will provide location information that
is accurate to within one meter (or just over three feet).61 Though not
currently accessible by U.S. law enforcement, the technological advancements
of the Galileo system foreshadow similar developments in the American
system. Indeed, with the launch of the Block III satellites, the accuracy of
62
GPS may eclipse that of Galileo. Indeed, according to some estimates,
54.
Compact GPS Tracks Footsteps Around the World, supra note 53, at 64.
55.
GPS Goes One Up, GPS WORLD, Feb. 2006, at 18, available at http://www.gpsworld.com/
gpsworld/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=302702&searchString=%22GPS%20goes%20one%20up%22.
56.
Id.
57.
DEF. SCI. BD. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 45–46.
58.
Id.
59.
Id. at 60.
60.
Id. In addition to the improvements in the American system, both the Europeans
and the Russians are launching their own satellite networks. See Galileo Gets Up—Sat Launched,
Signal Received, Contract Signed, GPS W ORLD , Feb. 2006, at 15, 18, available at
http://www.gpsworld.com/gpsworld/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=300336&searchString=%22Galileo
%20gets%20up%22. In December 2005, the European Union launched GIOVE-A, the first
satellite in its Galileo project. Id. at 15. Ultimately, a full constellation of thirty satellites
will comprise the Galileo system. Id. at 17.
61.
Temex Times Galileo, GPS WORLD, Feb. 2006, at 58, available at http://www.gpsworld.com/
gpsworld/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=300299.
62.
Id.

Tied Up in Knotts?

421

assuming the continued evolution of computing power and surveillance
technology, “by 2023 large organizations will be able to devote the equivalent of a contemporary PC to monitoring every single one of the 330
million people who will then be living in the United States.” 63
The ability of GPS to allow law enforcement to so thoroughly monitor
the movements of individuals raises substantial Fourth Amendment
concerns. As the Court has recognized, foreseeable advances in a particular
technology must be considered when evaluating the appropriate limits of
Fourth Amendment protection.64 Given that GPS-based products are in
65
development that will be small enough to implant under the human skin,
the cautions of the Supreme Court in Kyllo v. United States66 are meaningful.
As the Court noted there, “the [Fourth Amendment] rule we adopt must
take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in
development.”67 In light of the current and future capabilities of GPS
technology, let us turn now to an examination of the historical treatment of
surveillance technologies under the Fourth Amendment.

II.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ENHANCED
SURVEILLANCE METHODS

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures and imposes both a particularity and probable cause requirement
upon all warrants that issue.68 The Supreme Court has interpreted the
protection afforded by the amendment to mean that warrantless searches
are presumptively unreasonable.69 This general rule is subject to only a
70
handful of limited exceptions.
In the context of searches, the Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis
can be divided into two elements: applicability and satisfaction.71 William
Greenhalgh described the elements as follows: “[B]efore spinning our
wheels in an exercise of futility inquiring whether the Fourth Amendment
63.
Farmer & Mann, supra note 52, at 38; see also White, supra note 51, at 12.
64.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001).
65.
See Simon Romero, Location Devices’ Use Rises Prompting Privacy Concerns, N.Y. T IMES ,
Mar. 4, 2001, § 1, at 1.
66.
533 U.S. 27.
67.
Id. at 36.
68.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
69.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948).
70.
Id. at 14–15.
71.
WILLIAM W. GREENHALGH, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK: A CHRONOLOGICAL
SURVEY OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 1 (2d ed. 2003).
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has been satisfied, we must pause at the threshold to inquire whether the
Fourth Amendment is even applicable so as to require satisfaction.”72 In
other words, before deciding whether a warrant is required or whether
some lesser procedure will suffice in any given case, the Court must first
look to whether the official conduct complained of falls within the ambit
of the amendment at all. Thus, the warrant protections of the Fourth
Amendment will only become relevant to law enforcement’s use of GPSenhanced surveillance if such surveillance is deemed a search. I therefore
turn first to how the Supreme Court has defined a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes.73 After resolving that question, I will consider satisfaction and the procedural safeguards that are necessary to make official use
of GPS technology constitutional.
A. A Search or Not a Search, That Is the Question
A single definition for the term “search” is not readily communicated
by the existing law. As one scholar has noted, “the Supreme Court has
executed in an erratic and often contradictory manner . . . its interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment.”74 Indeed, one could fairly suggest that on even
the most preliminary question—what test should be used to decide whether a
search has occurred—the Court has not been clear.75 Nonetheless, logical
threads exist in the jurisprudence.
72.
Id. at 2.
73.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits both searches and seizures. Horton v. California,
496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990) (“A search compromises the individual interest in privacy; a seizure
deprives the individual of dominion over his or her person or property.”) In the case of GPSenhanced tracking, the installation of a device would presumably be evaluated under the seizure
provisions of the amendment, while the monitoring of any such device would be evaluated
under the search terms. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712–13 (1984) (distinguishing
between the constitutional issues raised by the installation and the monitoring of a tracking
device). In this Article, I limit my analysis to the search prong of the Fourth Amendment. There
is of course an equally interesting line of analysis raised by the question of whether installation
of such a device constitutes a seizure. However, the Court has, to this point, left open the
question of whether installation triggers constitutional concerns. See United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276, 279 n.** (1983); see also United States v. Garcia, No. 05-CR-155-C, 2006 WL 298704,
at *8 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 3, 2006) (finding that installation of a GPS-monitoring device required at
least a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity). For now, I defer consideration of that issue.
74.
BRADFORD P. WILSON, ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A JURISPRUDENTIAL
HISTORY 4 (1986); see also Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (observing that “[t]he course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures . . . has not—
to put it mildly—run smooth”); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134 (1954) (describing the
Court’s Fourth Amendment case law as “inconstant and inconsistent”).
75.
In 1998, Justice Scalia, writing in concurrence, described the two-pronged Katz test as
a “fuzzy” standard poorly suited for the threshold question of application. Minnesota v. Carter,
525 U.S. 83, 91–92 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 97 (criticizing the Katz test as
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On nearly thirty occasions since 1927, the Supreme Court has analyzed law enforcement’s use of sense-enhancing aids76 through the lens of the
Fourth Amendment. The Court’s analysis has evolved over the years with
its clearest analytical shift announced in 1967 in Katz v. United States.77
Prior to Katz, the Court largely defined a search as a function of some
physical invasion by the government. However, in Katz the Court rejected
the physical invasion trigger, and began to rely instead upon a two-part
test that examined the objective reasonableness of an individual’s
subjective expectation of privacy.
1.

Physical Invasion as a Proxy for Fourth Amendment Application

The decision in Olmstead v. United States78 marks the Court’s first clear
effort to analyze an enhanced form of surveillance under the Fourth
Amendment. There, the Court considered whether the government’s
months-long use of a wiretapping device to record the private telephone
conversations of petitioner Roy Olmstead (and others) constituted a constitutionally impermissible search.79 Describing the physical means of installing the wiretap, the Court explained that “[s]mall wires were inserted along
the ordinary telephone wires from the residences of four of the petitioners
and those leading from the chief office. The insertions were made without
trespass upon any property of the defendants.”80
Retracing its evolving interpretation of the Fourth Amendment,
the Olmstead Court noted that it had recently taken steps to broaden

“notoriously unhelpful” and “self-indulgent”). However, just three years later, Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority in Kyllo v. United States, lauded that same test as a readily workable
touchstone, which he used to determine whether a search of the interior of a home had occurred.
533 U.S. 27, 32–34 (2001).
76.
I use the terms “sense-enhancing aids” and “enhanced surveillance” to include not only
technological enhancements like spike mikes and thermal imagers, but also drug-sniffing dogs.
Indeed, in United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), Justice Brennan warned of the ready
progression from canine-assisted to technology-assisted methods of surveillance. Id. at 137–38
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (warning that adherence to the conclusion that dog sniffs are not
searches “may very well have paved the way for technology to override the limits of law in
the area of criminal investigation”).
77.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
78.
277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347, and Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967).
79.
Roy Olmstead was suspected by the government of running a major liquor smuggling
ring. The venture employed more than fifty people and grossed in the neighborhood of $2
million annually. Id. at 455–56.
80.
Id. at 456–57.
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the amendment’s protections.81 However, to the consternation of the Olmstead
dissent, the Court declined to continue this expansion in the case before
it.82 Noting that there had been no “actual physical invasion” of the defendants’ property, the Court refused to find a constitutional violation.83 With
Olmstead, the Court recognized a new constitutional threshold for Fourth
Amendment protection—tangible physical intrusion by the government.
Fourteen years after Olmstead, in Goldman v. United States,84 the
Court reaffirmed its commitment to the threshold requirement of tangible
physical intrusion. In Goldman, law enforcement officers listened in on
the defendants’ conversations as they took place in a private office.85 Unbeknownst to the defendants, the officers placed a detectaphone against the
wall of an adjoining office to pick up and amplify the sound waves emanating from the private office.86 When the transcriptions of the captured
87
conversations were offered at trial, the defendants objected. Adhering to
the principles first enunciated in Olmstead, the Goldman Court refused to
find a constitutional violation.88 After disposing of the notion that use
81.
The Olmstead Court surveyed its decisions in seven prior cases and found that, in each,
it had maintained or expanded the application of the Fourth Amendment’s protections. Id. at 458–62
(discussing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298 (1921); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925)). However, signaling its reluctance to
find a constitutional violation in the case before it, the Olmstead Court further noted that in
Gouled v. United States, one of the later cases in the series of seven, it had “carried the inhibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures to the extreme limit.” Id. at 463.
82.
In a prescient dissent, Justice Brandeis observed that “[c]lauses guaranteeing to the
individual protection against specific abuses of power, must have a . . . capacity of adaptation to
a changing world.” Id. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Criticizing the majority for its
overly technical reading of the amendment, Justice Brandeis noted:
“[I]n the application of a Constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of what has
been, but of what may be.” The progress of science in furnishing the Government with
means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be
developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers,
can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most
intimate occurrences of the home.
Id. at 474 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
83.
Id. at 464–66.
84.
316 U.S. 129 (1942).
85.
Id. at 131.
86.
Id. at 131–32.
87.
Id. at 132.
88.
Id. at 135–36. In language reminiscent of Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead,
Justice Murphy, writing in dissent, cautioned that the Goldman majority’s interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment was insufficiently mindful of potential technological advance:
[T]he search of one’s home or office no longer requires physical entry, for science
has brought forth far more effective devices for the invasion of a person’s privacy than
the direct and obvious methods of oppression which were detested by our forebears and
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of the detectaphone resulted in a trespass, the Court went on to comment
that “[t]he petitioners ask us, if we are unable to distinguish Olmstead
v. United States, to overrule it. This we are unwilling to do.”89 The
Court continued to explicitly and implicitly endorse the analytical model
requiring actual physical invasion as a necessary element of any Fourth
Amendment search for another three decades before rejecting it in
its entirety.90
2.

The Rise of the Two-Part Katz Test

The rejection of Olmstead’s physical invasion analysis finally came in
1967 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz.91 Charles Katz was a
gambler who used a particular public telephone booth at approximately the
same time each morning to place bets.92 The police investigating Katz’s
which inspired the Fourth Amendment. Surely the spirit motivating the framers
of that Amendment would abhor these new devices no less. . . . Such invasions of
privacy, unless they are authorized by a warrant . . . or otherwise conducted under
adequate safeguards defined by statute, are at one with the evils which have
heretofore been held to be within the Fourth Amendment and equally call for
remedial action.
Id. at 139–40 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
89.
Id. at 135.
90.
See Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158, 158 (1964) (Clark, J., concurring) (finding that
the physical intrusion made by a small listening device that the police had inserted into a party
wall was sufficient to constitute “actual trespass” and thereby violate the Fourth Amendment);
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 430–31, 439–40 (1963) (relying upon the lack of any “unlawful physical invasion of petitioner’s premises” to find that the petitioner’s Fourth Amendment
rights were not violated when an individual who the petitioner knew to be an IRS agent secretly
recorded conversations the two had in the petitioner’s office); Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 511–12 (1961) (finding that the police use of a “spike mike,” which made contact with
a heating duct in the defendant’s home, was a sufficient trespass to trigger Fourth Amendment
protection); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 132, 136–38 (1954) (finding that the police
“flagrantly, deliberately, and persistently violated the fundamental principle declared by the
Fourth Amendment” when they repeatedly entered defendant’s home surreptitiously to install a
listening and recording device, but affirming conviction after refusing to impose the
federal sanction of evidentiary exclusion on the states); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747,
751–54 (1952) (finding no violation of the Fourth Amendment because, inter alia, petitioner
could not establish trespass by the wired undercover agent, who was present on the property
with petitioner’s consent); cf. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 (1967) (finding that New
York’s eavesdropping statute violated the Fourth Amendment because, inter alia, it authorized
“trespassory intrusion into a constitutionally protected area”); Osborn v. United States, 385
U.S. 323, 327 (1966) (distinguishing Silverman, but citing Lopez with approval); Lanza v. New
York, 370 U.S. 139, 142–47 (1962) (citing with approval Silverman’s trespass-based notion of
searches, but declining, in dicta, to extend the constitutional protections recognized there to
electronic eavesdropping conducted in the visitors’ room of a public jail).
91.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
92.
Id. at 354 n.14.
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wagering activity attached a small listening device to the outside of the
telephone booth, enabling the police to record six of Katz’s telephone calls.
The prosecution introduced these calls into evidence at trial over Katz’s
objection.93 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction, finding that the
absence of any physical intrusion into the phone booth precluded the
Fourth Amendment’s application.94
Had the Supreme Court adhered to the logic enunciated in its
earlier cases, it too would have affirmed the conviction. However, the
Supreme Court radically departed from its earlier holdings, rejecting its
95
predication of Fourth Amendment protection on physical intrusion.
Acknowledging that “the absence of such penetration was at one time
thought to foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry,”96 the Court went
on to conclude that “‘[t]he premise that property interests control the right
of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.’”97 Indeed,
the Katz Court appeared to go to great lengths to ensure that the Fourth
Amendment was dislodged from its property rights perch.98 As the Court
93.
Id. at 348, 354 n.14.
94.
Id. at 348–49.
95.
Id. at 353. Justice Brennan suggested in his dissent in Lopez that the Court actually
rejected a link between trespass and Fourth Amendment protection long before the Katz
decision in 1967. 373 U.S. at 460–61 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Citing Silverman, 365 U.S. at
505, Justice Brennan stated “the Court . . . has expressly held . . . that an actual trespass need not
be shown in order to support a violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Lopez, 373 U.S. at 460–61
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan is correct that the Silverman Court found a Fourth
Amendment violation without first requiring proof of a technical trespass within the
meaning of local property law. See Silverman, 365 U.S. at 505, 511 (“Inherent Fourth
Amendment rights are not inevitably measurable in terms of ancient niceties of tort or real property
law.”). However, the Silverman Court did require evidence of an actual physical invasion.
Id. at 512 (“[Our] decision here does not turn upon the technicality of a trespass upon a party wall
as a matter of local law. It is based upon the reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area.”). Consequently, notwithstanding Justice Brennan’s observation in Lopez,
Silverman cannot be read as a rejection of the physical invasion requirement first established in
Olmstead. See also Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969) (refusing retroactive application of its decision in Katz because “[h]owever clearly our holding in Katz may have been
foreshadowed, it was a clear break with the past”).
96.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464, 466).
97.
Id. at 353 (alteration in original) (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)).
98.
Id. at 351. Some scholars have suggested that Katz should not be read to completely
redefine the Court’s approach to the Fourth Amendment. For example, Orin Kerr posited that the
case reflects little more than the adoption of a “looser” property-based model. See Kerr,
supra note 3, at 820–23. However, in light of the Court’s own pronouncements regarding its
intentions in the case, see, e.g., Desist, 394 U.S. at 248, I side with those who interpret the case as a
“clear break” with the past, see, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, A World Without Privacy: Why Property Does
Not Define the Limits of the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 889, 894 (2004) (“Protecting property . . . has in the past largely encompassed protecting
privacy as well, and it is thus misleading to characterize the Fourth Amendment, textually or
historically, as relevant to property but not to privacy.”).
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declared, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”99 The
reformulation of the Fourth Amendment analysis in Katz allows for
fuller recognition of the true scope of protection provided by the amendment
because the amendment’s reach is no longer strictly limited to age-old
notions of trespass.
Newly framing the question of the existence of a search, the Katz
Court held that “[o]ne who occupies [a phone booth], shuts the door behind
him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast
to the world.”100 Phrasing the question of constitutional application
somewhat differently, Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion,
enunciated a two-part test to determine whether law enforcement activity
constitutes a search: “first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”101
In subsequent cases, the Court has adopted Justice Harlan’s twopronged formulation of Fourth Amendment application as the standard
analysis for determining whether or not a search has occurred.102 And, while
some scholars have asserted that the time has come to “jettison” Katz’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” formula for defining searches,103 the Court has,
at least for now, declined to accept that invitation. Therefore, to assess
whether particular government conduct constitutes a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, we must consider what it means for an
individual’s subjective expectation of privacy104 to be objectively reasonable.

99.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. Notwithstanding the Katz Court’s pronouncement that the
Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places,” subsequent cases make clear that Katz should
not be read as a complete rejection of the concept that some places are indeed protected by the
amendment. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969).
100.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
101.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
102.
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 211 (1986).
103.
Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine of
Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 546 (2005); see also Thomas K. Clancy,
What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307,
339 (1998) (arguing that use of privacy notions to define the amendment’s protection leaves the
amendment subject to “the vagaries of shifting Court majorities, which are able to manipulate
the concept to either expand or contract the meaning of the word at will”).
104.
As Justice Brennan has observed, the right to privacy encompasses the dual (and
independent) interests of security and secrecy. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 776 n.4
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Security is the Fourth Amendment interest intruded upon by the
government’s physical intrusion into a space. Secrecy, on the other hand, is the interest
potentially implicated by nonphysical forms of government surveillance. Id.
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The first element of Justice Harlan’s test examines an individual’s subjective expectations. It looks at whether an individual has demonstrated
105
that he “‘seeks to preserve something as private.’” To make this assessment,
the Court examines the defendant’s conduct to determine whether that
conduct suggests a personal desire for privacy.106 In this regard, the
Court has found that affirmative steps like erecting fences and packaging contraband in closed luggage are sufficient to satisfy the first prong
of Katz.107
However, the analysis does not end there. A personal desire for privacy,
no matter how earnestly held, does not trigger Fourth Amendment protection
unless the desire is one that society is prepared to embrace as reasonable.108 The
Court’s refusal to align completely the Fourth Amendment’s protection with
the first factor in Katz is prudent because of the obvious weaknesses in
allowing individual behavior alone to define the suitable contours of rights
shared by a community. As the Supreme Court has noted, “where an individual’s subjective expectations ha[ve] been ‘conditioned’ by influences alien
to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of
Fourth Amendment protection was.”109 In light of these concerns, the Court
has determined that the Fourth Amendment demands more than the mere
examination of individual hopes and beliefs.110 In Katz, this “something
more” was defined as the societal assessment of reasonableness.
105.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351). The
first prong of the Katz test has alternatively been described as examining whether the defendant
“acted in such a way that it would have been reasonable for him to expect that he would not be
observed.” United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1980).
106.
In Ciraolo, the Court found that the defendant’s construction of two fences—one six
feet tall and a second ten feet tall—around the entire perimeter of his property, 476 U.S. at 209,
demonstrated a “subjective intent and desire to maintain privacy as to his unlawful agricultural
pursuits,” id. at 211. However, the Court went on to observe that Ciraolo had taken no steps to
shield his backyard from aerial views. Id. at 211–12. This failure, the Court found, left open the
question of whether Ciraolo possessed “a subjective expectation of privacy from all
observations . . . .” Id. at 212. Similarly, in Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989), the Court
observed that the defendant’s failure to completely cover his greenhouse defeated any claim that
he possessed a subjective expectation of privacy in the interior of the structure. Id. at 450.
107.
See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at
209, 211.
108.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 740–41.
109.
Id. at 741 n.5.
110.
See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 384 (1974) (“An actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in a
statement of what Katz held or in a theory of what the fourth amendment protects.”).
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The second element of the Katz test—the objective reasonableness
prong—takes an individual’s professed expectation of privacy and analyzes
it through the lens of objectivity.111 At this step of the analysis, the
question becomes whether “society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”
the right to privacy asserted by the individual.112 According to the Court,
“[t]he test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal
assertedly ‘private’ activity. Rather, the correct inquiry is whether the
government’s intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values
protected by the Fourth Amendment.”113 Indeed, in striking an appropriate
balance between the two prongs of the Katz test, the Court has chosen to
weigh far more heavily the objective reasonableness inquiry.114
While the Court has devoted a larger share of its analysis to the second
prong of the test, it has never explicitly defined the precise factors that
render a subjective expectation objectively reasonable. But, that is not to
say that the Supreme Court has provided no guidance in its discussions.
Although no single factor is deemed determinative in assessing the legitimacy
of asserted subjective expectations, the Court has considered, for example,
the manner in which a person used a particular location.115 The Court has
also examined whether “precautions customarily taken by those seeking
111.
The Court’s decision in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), is a salient
example of a constitutional analysis driven by the objective reasonableness prong. Id. at 177
(“The Amendment does not protect the merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only those
‘expectation[s] that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’” (alteration in original)
(internal quotation omitted) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967))).
In Oliver, the defendant was charged with growing marijuana on his property in a field behind
his house. Id. at 173. There was little dispute that the defendant had demonstrated a clear
subjective expectation of privacy with regard to the field. Id. Indeed, to get to the marijuana,
the police traveled onto defendant’s property and around a locked gate posted with a “No
Trespassing” sign. Id. Several hundred yards past the gate, a barn, and a parked camper,
they found the defendant’s crop. Id. The trial court suppressed the evidence, finding that
the defendant “had done all that could be expected of him to assert his privacy in the area
of the farm that was searched.” Id. (referring to the trial court’s decision). However,
while acknowledging that the defendant made clear his subjective desire for privacy, the
Court concluded that that desire ought not to be given legal validity. Id. at 179; see also
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) (concluding that society was not prepared
to recognize as reasonable defendant’s expectation of privacy in “trash left for collection in
an area accessible to the public”); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978)
(“Obviously . . . a ‘legitimate’ expectation of privacy by definition means more than a
subjective expectation of not being discovered.”).
112.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
113.
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182–83 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 182 n.13 (“Certainly the
Framers did not intend that the Fourth Amendment should shelter criminal activity wherever
persons with criminal intent choose to erect barriers and post ‘No Trespassing’ signs.”).
114.
See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 n.7 (1984); Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 n.5
(noting that “a normative inquiry would be proper”).
115.
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 153 (Powell, J., concurring).
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privacy” were taken, and whether the governmental intrusion was one that
would have been objectionable to the framers.116 A subjective expectation
of privacy may also be deemed reasonable if it is buttressed by concepts
external to the Fourth Amendment, like property law or “‘understandings
that are recognized and permitted by society.’”117
Finally, in the case of enhanced surveillance, the Court has also
indicated that the relative intrusiveness of government conduct is a critical
element of the second prong of Katz.118 It is this final conceptualization of
the objective reasonableness inquiry that permits the Fourth Amendment
to enjoy continued relevance, even in the face of technologically enhanced
surveillance that the framers could never have envisioned.
C.

Defining Objective Reasonableness by Referencing Intrusiveness

For as long as the Court has employed the two-part Katz inquiry to
evaluate the constitutionality of enhanced surveillance, it has incorporated
an examination of intrusiveness into its assessment of objective reasonableness.
For example, the Katz Court itself, in assessing the legitimacy of Katz’s
expectation of privacy, was guided in large part by consideration of the
degree of intrusion occasioned by the government’s warrantless use of a
surveillance aid. Where Katz’s complaint was that the government’s listening device broadcasted not simply the volume of his voice or number he
dialed but also “the words he utter[ed] into the mouthpiece,”119 the Court
concluded that Katz’s subjective expectation of privacy was objectively
reasonable. In contrast, the Court has determined that no Fourth Amendment
concerns are implicated where the government’s intrusion is less significant.120
Notwithstanding the Court’s embrace of intrusiveness as an ingredient
of the second prong of Katz, some commentators have suggested that
continued use of the inquiry is ill-advised in that it reinvigorates the
long-discarded physical invasion trigger. Under this view, the intrusiveness
inquiry is seen as little more than an assessment of the “level of physical
116.
Id. at 152–53.
117.
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12).
118.
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122–23 (1979) (finding that a field test that
revealed only the presence of cocaine was not a search).
119.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967); see also id. at 353 (“The Government’s
activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy
upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth . . . .” (emphasis added)).
120.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (characterizing the pen register used by
the government as a form of technology with “limited capabilities” because it revealed only the
numbers punched into the keypad, but not the contents of any communication).
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invasiveness” of a particular surveillance method.121 Though the similitude
of the terminology—“intrusiveness” and “invasiveness”—perhaps provides
an explanation for the conflation, any analysis that reduces the Court’s
intrusiveness inquiry to a measurement of physical invasion alone simply
cannot be squared with the case law.122
Moreover, although the point of contention may be more semantic
than substantive, if the hope is to offer clarity to the contours of Fourth
Amendment doctrine, a first step in that direction must be adherence to a
common vocabulary. As the Court has repeatedly indicated, far from
signaling a revitalization of the physical invasion trigger, the intrusiveness
inquiry provides a nuanced and meaningful way to assess the encroachment
into private affairs occasioned by, among other things, new forms of
surveillance technology. So, what does the inquiry encompass?
A variety of terms—“nature,” “type,” “manner,” “quality,” “specificity,”
“content,” and “quantity”—have been used to describe the two queries that
make up the intrusiveness inquiry. For the sake of simplicity, I will use
121.
See, e.g., Ric Simmons, The Two Unanswered Questions of Illinois v. Caballes: How to
Make the World Safe for Binary Searches, 80 TUL. L. REV. 411, 436, 438–39 (2005) (suggesting that
the intrusiveness inquiry should be discarded entirely because it signals a resurgence of the
physical intrusion trigger). To the extent that Ric Simmons suggests only that application of
Fourth Amendment search doctrine should not turn on the question of physical invasion,
we are in agreement. However, I cannot agree, and the case law does not support, the further
notion that the “intrusiveness” of government conduct (when properly defined as the quality and
quantity of information potentially revealed by surveillance) is irrelevant to the existence of a search.
122.
In his article, Simmons cites the Supreme Court’s decision in Bond v. United States, 529
U.S. 334 (2000), as evidence that application of an intrusiveness inquiry constitutes a revitalization of the physical invasion trigger. Simmons, supra note 121, at 437. In Bond, the Court
found that a Border Patrol agent’s physical manipulation of a bus passenger’s luggage constituted
an unreasonable search. 529 U.S. 334. While Simmons’s reading of Bond arguably finds some
traction in the Court’s language, a closer reading of the case reveals that the Bond Court did
not in fact conflate the two concepts. As Simmons noted, the Court did observe that “‘[p]hysically
invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection.’” Simmons, supra note
121, at 436 (alteration in original) (quoting Bond, 529 U.S. at 337). However, beyond this
observation, at no time did the Court go on to equate Fourth Amendment intrusiveness with
notions of trespass. In Bond, the greater intrusion for purposes of the Fourth Amendment
resulted from the quality and quantity of information revealed by the officer’s manipulation, not the physical nature of that inspection. Indeed, that the Court did not intend
for the intrusiveness inquiry to resuscitate the physical invasion trigger is made clear by the
Court’s observation that not all physical contact with the bag was constitutionally objectionable. Bond, 529 U.S. at 338–39 (“[A] bus passenger clearly expects that his bag may be
handled. He does not expect that other passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course,
feel the bag in an exploratory manner. But this is exactly what the agent did here.” (emphasis
added)). In other words, though Simmons deems the terms “physical invasion” and “intrusiveness” as legally interchangeable, the Court does not. Intrusiveness is a term of art for
purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis and one that has developed a rich and significant
history in the context of analyzing the constitutionality of surveillance aids. Under these circumstances, rigorous adherence to a precise use of the language is crucial.
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the terms “type” and “quantity” to describe what the Court seems to
consider when evaluating intrusiveness. In short, the Court has focused
on what kind of information (type) is revealed by government surveillance
equipment, and the amount of information (quantity) potentially disclosed
by such enhanced surveillance when assessing the constitutionality of
government conduct.123
On paper, the inquiry suggests a balanced examination of both
124
In practice, however, the
concerns to assess objective reasonableness.
Court has employed a more lopsided application of the intrusiveness test
that is primarily driven by its assessment of the type of information that is
being uncovered. By primarily focusing upon the type of information that a
particular surveillance method is capable of exposing, the Court has, in large
part, tied the scope of Fourth Amendment protection to the categorization
of a technology as either sense augmenting or extrasensory. The Court’s
asymmetrical approach to intrusiveness is, however, neither necessary nor
desirable. Applying a more balanced consideration of the two intrusiveness
factors allows advanced technologies to be evaluated in a manner that is
consistent with the privacy notions embedded in the Fourth Amendment.125
Let’s look first though at how the Court has tended to analyze the first
prong—type.
1.

Differential Treatment Based on the Type of Information Revealed

When gauging the objective reasonableness of various privacy
expectations, the Court has leaned heavily on its assessment of the
type of information revealed to segregate challenged surveillance
technologies into two rough groups: sense-augmenting surveillance and
extrasensory surveillance. Sense-augmenting surveillance refers to
123.
See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (concluding that any expectation of
privacy the owner had in his luggage was not unreasonably violated by a dog sniff because “no other
investigative procedure . . . is so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained
and in the content of the information revealed by the procedure” (emphasis added)); see also
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 707, for the proposition
that a dog sniff “discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item” (emphasis
added)); Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124 (finding that a warrantless field test for cocaine did not intrude
upon any legitimate expectations of privacy where “the manner in which information is obtained
through this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search” (emphasis
added) (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 707)). It should be noted that the proposition that dog sniffs
are limited inspections, which reveal only the presence or absence of contraband, has been called
into question. See, e.g., Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The infallible dog,
however, is a creature of legal fiction.”).
124.
See, e.g., Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
125.
See infra Part II.C.2.
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surveillance that reveals information that could theoretically be attained
through one of the five human senses. With regard to this type of
surveillance, the Court has tended to find that simple mechanical substitutes for or enhancements of human perception typically trigger no Fourth
Amendment concerns in cases in which human perception alone would
not have required a warrant.
Extrasensory surveillance, conversely, is that which reveals information
otherwise indiscernible to the unaided human senses. The Court has
adopted a more privacy-protective view of this form of technologically
enhanced police conduct. In fact, the case law suggests that surveillance of
this type is largely prohibited in the absence of a warrant.
a.

The Court’s Permissive Treatment of Sense-Augmenting Surveillance

The first three post-Katz cases in which the Court used intrusiveness to
measure objective reasonableness were United States v. Caceres,126 Smith
v. Maryland,127 and United States v. Knotts.128 In these cases, the Court
approved the warrantless use of the surveillance aids in question only after
examining the type of information revealed and categorizing the use of those
aids as mere sense-augmented surveillance.
In Caceres, the Court considered, among other things, whether the
Fourth Amendment prohibited an IRS agent’s surreptitious use of a recording
device during conversations with the defendant.129 The Court found that it
did not.130 In reaching this conclusion, the Court took extended note of the
fact that the recording device was essentially a mechanical substitute for

126.
440 U.S. 741 (1979).
127.
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
128.
460 U.S. 276 (1983). Prior to Caceres, the Court considered five cases involving
enhanced surveillance without specifically examining the intrusiveness of the challenged
government conduct. In each of these cases, however, the narrow nature of the question
before the Court, or the broader inapplicability of Katz, precluded the intrusiveness inquiry.
See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 4 (1977) (observing without further comment
that the challenged search of the defendant’s footlocker was preceded by a dog sniff); United States
v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 299 (1972) (examining whether presidential authorization of
enhanced surveillance in matters of national security could constitutionally replace prior judicial
authorization); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 754 (1971) (refusing to give retroactive
application to Katz); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 246 (1969) (same); Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 180 (1969) (limiting analysis to a question of standing and
the procedures to be applied in the lower court on remand).
129.
Caceres, 440 U.S. at 743.
130.
Id. at 751–52.
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the agent’s contemporaneous written notes.131 While conceding that the
type of information obtained by the recording device was somewhat
better than that produced through notes or unaided memory, the Court
declined to define the use of the device a search because the type of
information accessed by the device was coextensive with the type of information available to the agent alone: “If the conduct and revelations of an
agent operating without electronic equipment do not invade the defendant’s constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, neither does a
simultaneous recording of the same conversations . . . .”132
One month after the Caceres decision, the Court again approved of law
enforcement’s warrantless use of a surveillance device after characterizing
that device as mere sense augmentation.133 In Smith, the technology at issue
was a pen register.134 Describing the type of information revealed by the
device, the Court noted that “[t]he switching equipment that processed
those numbers is merely the modern counterpart of the operator who, in
an earlier day, personally completed calls for the subscriber.”135 The Court
explained that pen registers “disclose only the telephone numbers that have
been dialed . . . . Neither the purport of any communication between the
caller and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was
even completed is disclosed by pen registers.”136 Once again, the Court’s
determination that a device permitted only sense-augmented surveillance
led to the conclusion that a Fourth Amendment search had not occurred.
131.
Id. at 750 (quoting United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971), for the proposition
that “‘a police agent who conceals his police connections may write down for official use his
conversations with a defendant and testify concerning them, without . . . otherwise violating
the latter’s Fourth Amendment rights’”).
132.
Id. at 751 (quoting White, 401 U.S. at 751).
133.
Significantly, where the location of the search in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979), was a private home, the Court’s discussion of the intrusiveness of the technology mimics
that of the intrusiveness discussion in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). In both
cases, the searched location was a home, an area typically excluded from the intrusiveness
inquiry. Thus, it should have mattered little how the technology worked in either case.
Nonetheless, the majority in each case found it necessary to categorize the technology at issue
before assessing the constitutionality of its use without a warrant. As noted above, in
Kyllo, in which Fourth Amendment protection was extended, the majority’s description of
the thermal imager suggests that the devise is extrasensory. 533 U.S. at 34. In contrast, in Smith,
in which the Fourth Amendment was found not to apply, the pen register was characterized as
sense augmenting. 442 U.S. at 744.
134.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 736.
135.
Id. at 744.
136.
Id. at 741 (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977)). It
would also be plausible to suggest that the Court’s decision in Smith turned upon a determination that the scope of information potentially revealed by the pen register was extremely limited.
For a fuller discussion of the impact of the potential disclosure inquiry on constitutional
treatment, see infra Part II.C.2.
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Four years later in Knotts, the Court examined what it deemed to be
sense-augmenting technology once more before turning its focus to a pair of
cases involving extrasensory surveillance.137 The technology at issue in Knotts
was a beeper placed by law enforcement in a barrel of chloroform sold
to the defendant.138 A beeper is a battery-operated tracking device that emits
a weak radio signal, which can be followed using a receiver.139 Beepers do
not determine with any great degree of accuracy where a tracked subject is
140
located. Rather, they enable agents to discern when the beeper is nearby.
In other words, effective use of a beeper requires law enforcement’s presence
in the vicinity, for the signal emitted by the beeper is neither sufficiently
strong nor sufficiently precise to permit truly remote tracking.
The Knotts Court began by setting out the Katz two-part test as
the standard under which the government’s conduct should be evaluated.141
In working through its analysis of objective reasonableness, the Court
then turned to an examination of the intrusiveness of the beeper
technology.142 Qualitatively classifying beeper technology as sense
augmenting, the Knotts Court repeatedly observed that the type of
information revealed by the beeper did not exceed that which could
have been discovered through unaided observation.143 As the Court
found, “[t]he governmental surveillance conducted by means of the
beeper . . . amounted principally to the following of an automobile on
public streets and highways.”144 Consequently, the Knotts Court

137.
460 U.S. 276 (1983). Three months after issuing its decision in Knotts, the Court
decided United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). The extrasensory surveillance aid at
issue in Place was a drug-sniffing dog. Id. at 697–98. The next year, the Court decided United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), in which it determined that a warrant was not
needed to conduct a chemical field test for cocaine. Id. at 125.
138.
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277.
139.
Id.
140.
United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 112 (1st Cir. 1977).
141.
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280–81.
142.
Id.
143.
Id. at 282.
144.
Id. at 281; see also id. at 282 (noting that “[v]isual surveillance from public places along
[codefendant] Petschen’s route . . . would have sufficed to reveal all of these facts to the police”);
id. at 283–84 (observing that both the beeper at issue in Knotts and the pen register at issue in
Smith did nothing more than a human tracker or live operator would have been able to do); id.
at 284 (criticizing the lower appellate court, which rejected the warrantless use of the beeper, for
ignoring the “limited use which the government made of the signals from this particular
beeper”); id. at 285 (commenting that “[a] police car following Petschen at a distance throughout his journey could have observed him leaving the public highway and arriving at the
cabin owned by respondent”); id. (noting that “the beeper was [not] used in any way to reveal
information . . . that would not have been visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin”).
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determined that use of the beeper should not be deemed a search for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 145
The Court’s decisions in Caceres, Smith, and Knotts exemplify the
Court’s general treatment of technology that it believes should be classified
as sense augmenting. With regard to this class of technology, the Court
finds its warrantless use constitutionally unremarkable provided law enforcement’s unaided observation under the same circumstances would be unobjectionable. However, the Court has not been as noninterventionist in its
treatment of surveillance that the Court believes should be categorized
as extrasensory.
b.

The Court’s More Restrictive View of Extrasensory Surveillance Aids

In contrast with its largely permissive treatment of law enforcement’s
use of sense-augmenting technology, the Court’s assessment of the warrantless
use of extrasensory aids has been notably more restrictive. The impact of
characterizing a technology as extrasensory for purposes of defining its
proper Fourth Amendment treatment can be seen clearly in the Court’s
Kyllo decision.146
In that case, an agent at the U.S. Department of the Interior suspected
that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana inside his townhouse.147 The
agent was aware that such indoor growth would likely involve highintensity lamps and would therefore generate substantial amounts of heat.148
Consequently, the agent sat outside of Kyllo’s home early one January
145.
Id. at 284–85.
146.
Arguing that application of the Fourth Amendment should bear no relationship to
the type of information revealed by a particular technology or to the way in which the
technology operates, at least one commentator has suggested that the Court’s Kyllo
decision in fact was a repudiation of the longstanding distinction between sense augmenting
and extrasensory. See Simmons, supra note 121, at 433–34. There are two problems, however,
with Simmons’s conclusion. First, the Court has never suggested that functionality alone
is the key to constitutional treatment. Rather, as the Court has made clear, both the
functionality of a particular form of technology and the scope of information it can potentially
disclose are relevant to its constitutional treatment. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 122–23 (1984). Moreover, the suggestion that Kyllo is a repudiation of the
Court’s longstanding categorization of technology simply cannot be reconciled with the clear
language of the majority and dissenting opinions in the case, both of which took great pains
to objectively categorize the type of information revealed by the thermal imager in question.
Simmons is correct to suggest that a functionality analysis alone is ill-advised. However, this
statement does little to advance a meaningful discussion of the existing analytical framework, which incorporates analysis of both the functionality of government surveillance equipment and the quantity of information potentially revealed by its use.
147.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
148.
Id.
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morning with his partner and scanned the exterior of the structure with an
Agema Thermovision 210 thermal-imaging device.149 The device detected
infrared radiation, providing the agents with information about the
relative heat being emitted from various parts of Kyllo’s home.150
Both the majority and the dissent in Kyllo carefully considered how to
classify the type of information that the thermal imager revealed before
deciding upon its appropriate constitutional treatment. For the majority,
the thermal imager was clearly an extrasensory device, for it revealed
information that was “otherwise imperceptible” to the average human
being.151 Not surprisingly, the majority then used this characterization of
the technology to build its broader conclusion that warrantless use of the
thermal imager constituted a constitutionally unreasonable search.152
In contrast, the dissenting Justices, who found the warrantless use of
the thermal imager entirely unobjectionable, did so only after concluding
that the thermal imager was a sense augmenting (as opposed to an extrasensory)
aid. According to the dissent, “the ordinary use of the senses might enable
a neighbor or passerby to notice the heat emanating from a building.”153
The Kyllo decision is a pointed example of the ease with which
formalistic application of the intrusiveness test can cause constitutional
protections to rise or fall on the talismanic incantation of the sense-augmenting
or extrasensory categories. For the Kyllo majority, the determination that
the thermal imager operated in an extrasensory fashion essentially ended the
Court’s analysis.154 Once the initial classification had been made, the majority seemingly deemed serious scrutiny of the quantity of information potentially revealed by the thermal imager unnecessary. The Kyllo dissent reflects
a similar drift toward formalism.155

149.
Id. at 29–30.
150.
Id. at 30.
151.
Id. at 38 n.5; see also id. at 29 (observing that the thermal imager detected “infrared
radiation, which virtually all objects emit but which is not visible to the naked eye”); id. at
35 n.2 (disputing the dissent’s description of the thermal imager as a sense-augmenting device by
noting that “on the night of January 16, 1992, no outside observer could have discerned the
relative heat of Kyllo’s home without thermal imaging”).
152.
Id. at 40; see also id. at 38 n.5 (commenting that the Kyllo decision should be read to
vindicate the notion that a constitutional line is crossed whenever technology permits perception
of that which is otherwise imperceptible).
153.
Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154.
Id. at 34 (majority opinion) (“We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology
any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained
without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area’ constitutes a search.” (internal
citation omitted) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961))).
155.
Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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However, as the Court has acknowledged (though not faithfully
implemented), the simple categorization of a surveillance aid should not
end the constitutional inquiry. Notwithstanding the precise functional
classification of any particular technology, the quantity of information that
the technology can potentially disclose is also a critical component in
assessing its proper constitutional treatment.156 In other words, though
there are certainly examples of the Court being somewhat mechanical in its
constitutional treatment of surveillance technologies, such formalism is not
a compulsory attribute of the intrusiveness inquiry. Indeed, while brightline tests are certainly desirable in some areas, as discussed in greater
detail below, we must resist the pressure to reduce Fourth Amendment
analysis to little more than a question of into which box the government’s surveillance technology can most neatly be placed.
2.

Quantity as a Moderating Agent

In addition to the type of information that an emerging technology
reveals, the Court has also recognized that consideration of the amount of
information it can potentially disclose tempers, at the margins, the Court’s
unconditional application of the general rules stated above. Thus, in the
case of sense-augmenting technologies, where information of an admittedly
unremarkable character is nonetheless noteworthy for its sheer volume or
detail, the Court has suggested that Fourth Amendment protection is
appropriate. In contrast, where the quantity of information potentially
revealed is tightly circumscribed, the warrantless use of extrasensory surveillance has typically been approved.
For example, in Dow Chemical Company v. United States,157 the Court
was asked to consider whether the Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA) aerial photographing of an industrial plant constituted an unreasonable
search.158 The Court began its analysis with an examination of the type of
information revealed by the aerial camera.159 In this regard, the Court
noted that “a simple flyover with naked-eye observation” would not
constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.160 The
Court then observed that the technology being used by the EPA was not
156.
See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (examining both the type of
information revealed by the challenged dog sniff and the quantity of information disclosed).
157.
476 U.S. 227 (1986).
158.
Id. at 229.
159.
Id. at 231.
160.
Id. at 234.
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an extrasensory device, but rather was a mild augmentation of a naked-eye
view.161 However, the Court did not end its analysis with this categorization.
After acknowledging that the aerial camera was best classified as a
sense-augmenting device, the Court turned its attention to the particularity
of the information revealed in the photographs. For example, the Court
observed that the amount of information revealed by the photographs was
essentially limited to the outline of the physical plant. According to the
Court, “[n]o objects as small as 1/2-inch in diameter such as a class
ring, for example, are recognizable, nor are there any identifiable human
faces or secret documents captured in such a fashion as to implicate more
serious privacy concerns.”162 Based upon its two-fold conclusion regarding
the type and the quantity of information revealed by the EPA’s
technologically enhanced aerial surveillance, the Court declined to
find that a search had occurred.163
However, by way of comparison, the Court noted that a different
constitutional outcome might be reached when more technologically
advanced forms of aerial surveillance permit the government to uncover
greater quantities of information:
It may well be, as the Government concedes, that surveillance
of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance
equipment . . . such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally
proscribed absent a warrant. But the photographs here are not so reveal164
ing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns.

A similar appreciation for the moderating effect of informational quantity
(or particularity) was expressed by the Court in Knotts. As noted above,165 the
161.
Id. at 238 (“Here, EPA was not employing some unique sensory device that, for
example, could penetrate the walls of buildings and record conversations in Dow’s plants, offices
or laboratories . . . .”); see also id. (“The mere fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at
least to the degree here, does not give rise to constitutional problems.”). Interestingly, the district
court’s decision in the case, which found that the Fourth Amendment had been breached, was
grounded in reasoning that the aerial camera used by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) was better categorized as an extrasensory device. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States,
536 F. Supp. 1355, 1367 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (rejecting the EPA’s contention that “the camera
can’t see what the eye can’t see,” and finding that the camera captured “a great deal more than
the human eye could ever see”).
162.
Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 238–39 n.5.
163.
Id. at 239.
164.
Id. at 238; see also id. at 250 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting) (complaining that the majority
opinion “holds that Dow had no reasonable expectation of privacy from surveillance
accomplished by means of a $22,000 mapping camera, but that it does have a reasonable
expectation of privacy from satellite surveillance and photography”); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 215 n.3 (1986).
165.
See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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Knotts Court did not find that the tracking beeper before it triggered any
particular constitutional concerns because it was a mere sense-augmenting
device. Indeed, in keeping with the general refusal to place Fourth
Amendment restraints on the police use of surveillance that only mildly
augments the human senses, the Court observed that “[a] person traveling
in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements from one place to another.”166 However, the
167
Court also recognized a very important limitation to its language.
In response to the defendant’s warning that the Court’s ruling would
make possible “twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this
country . . . without judicial knowledge or supervision,”168 the Court was
careful to note that its opinion should not be read in this fashion. Recognizing that constitutional protections may be warranted if tracking
surveillance revealed more than the limited quantity of information disclosed
by a beeper, the Court observed, “if such dragnet type law enforcement
practices as [Knotts] envisions should eventually occur, there will be time
enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles may
be applicable.”169 The Court’s cautionary words in Dow Chemical and Knotts
underline the notion that while sense-augmenting surveillance does not
typically trigger Fourth Amendment concerns, where such devices reveal
information that is noteworthy for its potential volume or detail, constitutional protections may be required.
Consideration of the degree of potential disclosure has also impacted
the Court’s assessment of extrasensory devices. However, while consideration
of the quantity factor has extended the constitutional protection afforded to
individuals who are the subject of sense-augmented surveillance, by theoretically barring the warrantless use of sense-augmented surveillance that
reveals too much information, consideration of that same factor has
tended to restrict the constitutional protection afforded to subjects of
government surveillance enhanced by extrasensory aids, by allowing such
surveillance where the amount of information revealed is limited. Put
another way, analysis of the quantity of information potentially
revealed determines how much information is too much in the case of
166.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
167.
As discussed in greater detail below in Part III.A, some lower courts and legal
commentators read the Knotts decision as a blanket authorization of warrantless tracking in
public spaces. However, where such a reading of the case ignores the important limitations
that the Court itself placed on the holding, that reading should be rejected.
168.
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283.
169.
Id. at 284.
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sense-augmenting devices; and asks the question—is the potential
disclosure sufficiently limited?—in the case of extrasensory surveillance
tools. The clearest example of this is provided by the Court’s treatment of
so-called binary searches—extrasensory surveillance techniques that allow the
government agent to discern only the presence or absence of criminal activity.170
For example, in United States v. Place,171 the Court considered the
172
warrantless use of a dog to conduct a sniff test of closed luggage.
Unquestionably, the information revealed by the test—the presence of
narcotics—was not information that could have been ascertained by the
police using their unaided senses. Nonetheless, the Court declined to find
that use of the extrasensory aid was a Fourth Amendment search because
the amount of information revealed was extremely restricted.173 As the
Court found, “despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something
about the contents of the luggage, the information obtained is limited.”174
Less than a year after the Court’s decision in Place, the Court decided
United States v. Jacobsen.175 As in Place, the issue was the constitutionality
of the warrantless use of an investigative tool that revealed the presence of
narcotics. In Jacobsen, the extrasensory tool in question was a chemical
field test.176 The Jacobsen Court divided its analysis into two equally
significant parts—the lawfulness of the government’s initial seizure of the
defendant’s property and the lawfulness of the government field test to
determine that the property was cocaine.177 With regard to the latter half of
the analysis, the Court’s opinion was exclusively concerned with the limited
information revealed by the chemical analysis in question. As the Court
observed, “[t]he field test at issue could disclose only one fact previously
unknown to the agent—whether or not a suspicious white powder was
cocaine. It could tell him nothing more . . . .”178 In refusing to distinguish
Place from the case before it, the Jacobsen Court confirmed that its rule in

170.
Only two binary search methods are presently being effectively employed by law
enforcement agents: the dog sniff and the chemical field test for drugs. See generally Simmons,
supra note 121.
171.
462 U.S. 696 (1983).
172.
Id. at 697–99.
173.
Id. at 707 (“A ‘canine sniff’ by a well-trained narcotics detection dog, however, does
not require opening the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise
would remain hidden from public view . . . .”).
174.
Id.
175.
466 U.S. 109 (1984).
176.
Id. at 111.
177.
Id. at 115, 118–22.
178.
Id. at 122.
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the earlier case turned upon the fact that the dog sniff revealed such a
minute quantity of otherwise imperceptible information.179
3.

An Exception: Surveillance Within the Home

Before turning to consider how the government’s use of GPS-enabled
surveillance might be analyzed under the existing doctrine, it bears
mention that the one place where the relative intrusiveness of the
government’s conduct is generally not a relevant consideration for purposes of the Fourth Amendment is the home.180 Upon examination, the
Court’s refusal to question the intrusiveness of the government’s conduct
in this context makes perfect sense. The question of intrusiveness is one
that affects only the objective reasonableness of subjective expectations.
However, with regard to the home, the question of objective reasonableness
is not one that is typically factored into the Fourth Amendment
analysis. That is because a fairly clear analytical perimeter has been
drawn around the home.181 This perimeter finds its roots in the text of the
182
Fourth Amendment and has been largely respected by the Court. Indeed,
though Katz could be read as a declaration that places will be afforded
no special protection under the Fourth Amendment,183 the Court has
consistently maintained that, at least with regard to the home, the case should
not be read in this fashion. Just two years after Katz, the Court unambiguously
declared that it did not intend for Katz “to withdraw any of the protection

179.
Id. at 124 n.24 (noting that the Place decision was grounded not in the absence
of any “physical invasion of Place’s effects” but rather in the limited information revealed
by the dog sniff at issue in that case); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409–10
(2005) (observing that the different outcomes in Caballes and Kyllo could be justified in
part by the amount of information revealed in each case).
180.
See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (“The Fourth Amendment’s
protection of the home has never been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of
information obtained.”).
181.
Id. at 40 (“We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance
to the house.” (internal quotation omitted)).
182.
Cf. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 132, 136–38 (1954) (refusing to impose the
federal exclusionary rule as a sanction in that case upon the state actors, despite their repeated
intrusions into the petitioner’s home to install a concealed microphone, intrusions which
the Court characterized as “flagrantly, deliberately, and persistently violat[ing] . . . the
Fourth Amendment”).
183.
See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 191 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (complaining that “we have not buried Olmstead, so far as it dealt
with the substance of Fourth Amendment rights, only to give it new life in the law of standing.
Instead we should reject traditional property concepts entirely, and reinterpret standing law in
the light of the substantive principles developed in Katz” (emphasis added)).
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which the Amendment extends to the home,”184 and subsequent cases have
appreciated that the home is different for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.185
As a result of this line drawing, the analysis of the Fourth Amendment’s
application within the four walls of one’s home has been somewhat modified from
the traditional two-part Katz inquiry. In the context of the home, the Court has
consistently answered the question of objective reasonableness—the second prong
of the test—in the affirmative. In other words, “private residences are places in
which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion
not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is
prepared to recognize as justifiable.”186 Consequently, the analysis of the Fourth
Amendment’s application in the home essentially becomes compressed into a single question—does the defendant’s conduct demonstrate a subjective expectation
of privacy? Thus, at least within the four walls of one’s home,187 if an individual
plausibly asserts a subjective expectation of privacy, the Court seems prepared
to assume that society will accept that expectation as objectively reasonable.188
184.
Id. at 180.
185.
Compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), with United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705 (1984).
186.
Karo, 468 U.S. at 714; see also Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82 (acknowledging the
limited nature of information revealed by beeper technology, but nonetheless suggesting that the
warrantless use of such technology in the home would be constitutionally impermissible).
187.
The Court has seemed somewhat less inclined to include within this analytical perimeter areas beyond a home’s four walls, regardless of proximity to the home. See Florida v. Riley,
488 U.S. 445 (1989) (applying the objective reasonableness test to permit warrantless aerial
observation of a greenhouse located within a few feet of defendant’s home); California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207 (1986) (applying the objective reasonableness test to permit warrantless aerial
surveillance of the defendant’s fenced backyard).
188.
Arguably, the decision in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), is a notable exception to the
Court’s general pattern of assuming the objective reasonableness of one’s subjective expectation of privacy
with regard to activities conducted inside the four walls of one’s home. In Smith, the Court
was asked to consider whether the government’s use of a pen register to track the numbers dialed
from the defendant’s home telephone was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 736. In finding
that the pen register’s use did not constitute a search, the Court held that “even if petitioner
did harbor some subjective expectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain
private, this expectation” was not reasonable. Id. at 743. Notwithstanding the seeming
conflict between this ruling and the Court’s otherwise consistent policy, it is possible to
reconcile the two. The logic underlying reconciliation is weaved throughout the Smith opinion
itself. According to the Court, Smith knowingly transmitted the telephone numbers he dialed from his
home telephone to the telephone company. Id. at 743. This knowing transmission to a third party,
according to the Smith Court, defeated any expectation of privacy Smith might otherwise
have claimed in the information. Id. at 743–44. Described somewhat differently, Smith’s conduct was
analytically akin to leaving the sides and top of his greenhouse exposed and, therefore, deserving of no
greater respect by the Court. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 450 (finding that an officer’s observations through gaps
in a greenhouse’s roof and sides was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). I do
not broach in this Article the numerous concerns raised by the Smith Court’s “assumption of risk”
analysis. See generally Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that “[i]t is idle to speak of
‘assuming’ risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic alternative”).
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In light of the foregoing, with the exception of surveillance conducted
inside a suspect’s house, the question of whether the Fourth Amendment
places restrictions upon law enforcement’s use of GPS-enabled tracking
will turn, in large part, upon how reviewing courts view the relative
intrusiveness of the technology.

III.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S REASONABLENESS REQUIREMENT
AND THE USE OF GPS-ENHANCED SURVEILLANCE

As discussed in Part II, in order to determine whether the Fourth
Amendment in any way limits police use of GPS-enhanced surveillance, we
must consider both whether the individual being monitored has behaved
in a manner that suggests a desire for privacy, and whether the intrusiveness
of GPS-enhanced surveillance—as gauged by the type and the quantity
of information it potentially reveals—is sufficiently meaningful to trigger
Fourth Amendment concerns. In balancing these two questions, however,
one additional consideration is critical to any defensible reading of the
amendment’s application.
The Fourth Amendment, at its core, regulates police conduct. It
erects a wall between a free society and overzealous police action—a line of
defense implemented by the framers to protect individuals from the tyranny
of the police state. As Anthony Amsterdam has noted, “the framers
appreciated the need for a powerful central government. But they also
feared what a powerful central government might bring, not only to the
jeopardy of the states but to the terror of the individual.”189 Any justifiable
interpretation of the amendment in the future must appreciate this historical
purpose. Let us now turn to how, in light of this history, the existing case
law might resolve the question of whether any constitutional checks limit
GPS-enhanced surveillance in the hands of the police. I begin with an
examination of how that question has been answered in the lower courts.

189.

Amsterdam, supra note 110, at 400.
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A. Treatment of GPS-Enhanced Surveillance in Lower Federal Courts
and State Courts
To date, three federal courts190 and four state courts191 have directly
considered the question of whether there are limitations upon law enforcement’s
use of GPS-enabled tracking devices. Of these seven cases, one declined to
resolve the matter and the remaining six split evenly on the question of
whether law enforcement should be required to obtain a warrant before
engaging in the surreptitious use of a GPS tracking device.192 The cases,
considered collectively, reveal little about the likely holding of any forthcoming Supreme Court decision.
190.
This number does not include three federal court decisions that mention GPS
tracking—United States v. Eberle, 993 F. Supp. 794 (D. Mont. 1998); United States v. McIver, 186
F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Levit, 39 F. App’x 97 (6th Cir. 2002). Though the
police installed a GPS device on the defendant’s car in Eberle, 993 F. Supp. at 796–98, the legality
of that action was never reached by the district court. A radio transmitter was simultaneously
placed on the car by law enforcement and was, according to the district court’s opinion, the
only signal monitored by the surveillance team. Id.; see also McIver, 186 F.3d at 1123 (reviewing
the convictions of Eberle and his codefendant McIver, and observing that use of the GPS
tracking device was not at issue where that device malfunctioned, making the radio beeper the
only technology used during the challenged surveillance); Levit, 39 F. App’x at 99 (observing,
without further comment, that a GPS device was installed on the defendant’s vehicle).
191.
This number does not include two state court decisions that mention GPS tracking—
State v. Clifton, 580 S.E.2d 40 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003), and Whitehead v. State, 574 S.E.2d 351 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2002). In Clifton, the police located a car stolen by the defendant using the vehicle’s
factory-installed GPS technology. 580 S.E.2d at 42. However, the defendant never challenged
this action. Id. Similarly, in Whitehead, the police tracked the location of a confidential
informant using a GPS receiver. However, the defendant never raised the legality of this action
as a ground for relief on appeal. Whitehead, 574 S.E.2d at 354–55.
192.
In United States v. Berry, 300 F. Supp. 2d 366 (D. Md. 2004), the court found it
unnecessary to resolve the question of whether the use of a GPS device constitutes a search and
seizure. Id. at 368. However, three state courts have concluded (or assumed) that the use of a
GPS device requires some form of prior judicial authorization. See People v. Obujen, No.
H026715, 2005 WL 519233, at *10 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. May 7, 2005) (“Assuming, without
deciding, that the GPS surveillance of defendant’s vehicle was a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment . . . .”); People v. Lacey, No. 2363N/02, 2004 WL 1040676, at *8 (N.Y.
Nassau County Ct. May 6, 2004) (finding that a warrant is required to install a GPS
tracking device on a vehicle); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 230–31 (Wash. 2003) (finding
that a warrant is required prior to installation and use of a GPS device). In contrast, a fourth state
court and two federal courts have found that law enforcement’s surreptitious use of GPS
surveillance triggers no Fourth Amendment concerns at all. See United States v. Moran, 349 F.
Supp. 2d 425, 467 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that “there was no search or seizure and no Fourth
Amendment implications in the use of the GPS device”); People v. Gant, 802 N.Y.S.2d 839, 846
(N.Y. Westchester County Ct. 2005) (reading Knotts to support the limitless proposition that “a
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements from one place to another”); United States v. Garcia, No. 05-CR155-C, 2006 WL 298704, at *8 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 3, 2006) (recognizing that vast amounts of
information may be gathered through warrantless GPS tracking, but finding that “[h]owever
Orwellian and outrageous this may seem, it was settled in favor of the government in Knotts”).
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The courts in United States v. Moran,193 People v. Gant,194 and United
States v. Garcia195 rejected the notion that the warrantless monitoring of
196
GPS-enabled tracking devices triggers constitutional protections. However,
the courts in those cases reached that conclusion by avoiding the question
of whether such tracking constitutes a more substantial intrusion on privacy
than previously considered forms of surveillance.197
For example, in Moran, the police installed a GPS device on the
198
defendant’s car and monitored its movement for a period of two days.
The police did not obtain a warrant prior to installing and monitoring
the device.199 Before trial, Moran challenged the warrantless tracking of
his vehicle.200 However, the district court denied Moran’s suppression
201
Offering no analysis of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
motion.
United States v. Knotts,202 the district court simply cited the case as support
for the unbounded proposition that Moran had no “reasonable expectation
of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”203 The Knotts
decision, however, does not support the unqualified proposition for which
Moran cited it. As the Knotts Court itself recognized, its decision was
never intended to place “dragnet type” surveillance beyond the reach
204
of the U.S. Constitution.
I do not mean to suggest as an absolute matter that a court could never
legitimately conclude that constitutional oversight of GPS-enabled tracking
is unnecessary. However, it would seem at a minimum that before such
193.
349 F. Supp. 2d 425.
194.
802 N.Y.S.2d 839.
195.
2006 WL 298704.
196.
See supra note 192. It should be noted that the court in Garcia did find that the
installation of a GPS-monitoring device constituted a seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, requiring at least a reasonable suspicion on the part of law enforcement
that the defendant was engaging in criminal activity. Garcia, 2006 WL 298704, at *7 (“There is
no persuasive authority for the proposition that the government may, on nothing more than its
say-so, surreptitiously apply monitoring devices to the outside of private motor vehicles.”).
197.
In Gant, a New York state trial court did not discuss the intrusive capabilities of GPS.
Rather, the Gant court assumed sub silentio that GPS-enabled tracking merited the same
constitutional treatment that had previously been afforded to beeper technology. Gant, 802
N.Y.S.2d at 846–47. Similarly, in Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 467, the court treated use of GPSenabled devices as indistinguishable from mere visual surveillance.
198.
Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
199.
Id.
200.
Id.
201.
Id. at 468.
202.
460 U.S. 276 (1983).
203.
Moran, 349 F. Supp. at 467.
204.
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284 (“[I]f such dragnet type law enforcement practices as [Knotts]
envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether different
constitutional principles may be applicable.”).
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a conclusion can be drawn in any principled way, the judge must be
faithful to precedent. Disregard for the intrusiveness of GPS-enabled
technology ignores the Supreme Court’s directive that such inquiry is
relevant to a determination of constitutional treatment. Under the Court’s
existing analytical framework, before one can sensibly dismiss GPS-enabled
tracking as mere sense-augmenting technology that reveals constitutionally
unremarkable quantities of data, actual analysis of the type and the quantity
of information revealed by the technology must be undertaken. By failing
to engage in any analysis of the intrusion occasioned by GPS-enabled
surveillance, and by applying an overly simplistic reading of Knotts, Moran
and its progeny offer little in the way of predictive value for future Supreme
Court rulings.
Significantly, it is not just the lower court decisions permitting the
unfettered use of GPS-enabled surveillance that are of limited predictive
value. While the courts that have imposed a warrant requirement (or other
restriction) upon use of the technology offer a bit more in the way of
guidance, they too are not perfect predictors of the most likely result in
the Supreme Court. As noted above, three state courts have found that GPS
monitoring triggers privacy concerns. However, while these cases reach
what I believe to be the most constitutionally defensible result, they do so
by looking to sources outside of the Constitution. In other words, though
these cases, to their credit, recognize both the self-contained limitations
of the Knotts decision and the importance of evaluating intrusiveness
before declaring an absence of constitutional harm,205 they ground their
prohibition of warrantless GPS-enabled tracking in state, not Fourth
206
Amendment, law.
The Washington Supreme Court was the first state court to confront
the question of whether a warrant is required in connection with law
enforcement’s GPS-enabled tracking of a criminal suspect. In State v.
Jackson,207 the defendant, William Bradley Jackson, was suspected in the
205.
See, e.g., People v. Obujen, No. H026715, 2005 WL 519233, at *10 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. May 7, 2005) (recognizing that beeper tracking is not “equivalent to GPS surveillance,
because the electronic monitoring device merely allowed police to maintain their visual surveillance
of the defendant’s vehicle”).
206.
See, e.g., id. (finding GPS surveillance of the defendant’s vehicle permissible under
California law where the defendant was a probationer and the search was legitimately related
to law enforcement interests); People v. Lacey, No. 2463N/02, 2004 WL 1040676, at *4
(N.Y. Nassau County Ct. May 6, 2004) (finding, in a somewhat convoluted decision, that
article 1, section 12 of the New York State Constitution extends the protections of the Fourth
Amendment to the installation of a GPS device incorporating cellular technology).
207.
76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2003).
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disappearance of his nine-year old daughter, Valiree.208 After traditional
means of investigation failed to turn up any leads, the police obtained a
warrant to impound and search Jackson’s car.209 Unbeknownst to Jackson,
they also obtained a second warrant to install a GPS-enabled tracking
device on the car.210 For nearly a month, the police monitored this device,
and were able to precisely identify the locations visited by the suspect’s
truck and determine the exact amount of time he spent at each location.
These findings led the police to Valiree’s body, which was buried in a
shallow grave in a remote area of forest.211 Jackson was convicted of
212
murder following a jury trial.
On appeal, Jackson challenged the police use of the device.213 The
intermediate appellate court found first that the police did not need a
warrant to install and monitor the device.214 Accordingly, the court declined
to address Jackson’s associated claim that the warrant had been improperly
issued.215 The Washington Supreme Court, however, rejected the intermediate
216
appellate court’s basic conclusion that a warrant was unnecessary.
Looking to the state constitution, the Washington Supreme Court
first conceded that law enforcement would not have conducted a search
if it merely observed matters that were ‘“voluntarily exposed to the
general public and observable without the use of enhancement devices from
an unprotected area.’”217 However, the court went on to note that such
observations would constitute a search if particularly intrusive methods
of viewing were employed.218 Though the Jackson court did not rely upon
the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment case law, its attention to the
potential intrusiveness of the technology—as determined by reference to the
type and the quantity of information revealed—was entirely consistent
with the mandate of cases from Katz to Caceres. Considering the two
intrusiveness factors in turn, the Jackson court concluded that the intrusion
208.
Id. at 220.
209.
Id.
210.
Id. at 220–21.
211.
Id. at 221.
212.
Id.
213.
Id.
214.
Id. at 222.
215.
Id.
216.
Id. at 223.
217.
Id. at 222 (quoting State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 182 (1994)).
218.
Id. (“[T]he nature and extent of information obtained by the police, for example,
information concerning a person’s associations, contacts, finances, or activities is relevant in
deciding whether an expectation of privacy an individual has is one which a citizen of this
state should be entitled to hold.”).
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upon private affairs caused by GPS-enhanced tracking was sufficient to
merit the protection of a warrant.219
Examining first the type of information uncovered by GPS-enabled
surveillance, the Jackson court found it to be significantly different from the
quality of intrusion caused by visual monitoring.220 Implicitly referencing
the two categories of technology identified to date by the Supreme Court—
extrasensory and sense augmenting—the Jackson court concluded that GPS
surveillance should most fairly be treated as the former, and not the latter221:
“[W]hen a GPS device is attached to a vehicle, law enforcement officers
do not in fact follow the vehicle. Thus, unlike binoculars or a flashlight,
the GPS device does not merely augment the officers’ senses, but rather
provides a technological substitute for traditional visual tracking.”222
Though the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson does a
better job of tracking the intrusiveness inquiry than the decision in
Moran, the Washington Supreme Court’s reasoning is not above critique.
In finding the GPS tracking to be an extrasensory form of surveillance, the
Jackson court placed great weight upon the fact that the device relayed a
steady stream of information to law enforcement even though no police
officer was actually trailing the suspect.223 This observation led the
court to conclude that the information revealed through GPS-enhanced
surveillance was qualitatively different than the information disclosed
through the use of, for example, a flashlight. The U.S. Supreme Court’s
decisions, however, offer little support for the “human presence” distinction recognized by the Jackson court.
In its discussion of the type of information revealed by certain
forms of enhanced surveillance, the Supreme Court has assigned little
significance to the actual presence of an officer in any given case. Rather,
the distinction for the Supreme Court has depended upon whether the
human senses, as a theoretical matter, could have lawfully obtained the
type of information ferreted out by the technology. Thus, in Smith v.
Maryland,224 for example, the question was not whether an operator was
actually present to simultaneously complete the call for the subscriber at the
time the pen register recorded the numbers that were dialed. Rather, the
219.
Id. at 223–24.
220.
Id. at 223.
221.
Id. (observing that the information revealed by GPS devices was qualitatively different
from that revealed by sense-augmenting forms of technology like binoculars or flashlights).
222.
Id.
223.
Id.
224.
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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question the Smith Court posed was whether the information collected by
the pen register was of the sort that could have been lawfully obtained
through one of the five human senses.225
Moreover, as between the analysis applied by the Jackson court and
the quality analysis utilized in cases like Smith, there are a variety of advantages to the Supreme Court’s approach. First and foremost, by decoupling
human presence and the constitutional treatment of a technology, the
Supreme Court’s approach has the advantage of predictability. Under the
Court’s current framework, use of a technology can be evaluated using
forward-looking rules that are not so circumstance-specific that they cease
to be useful guides. Furthermore, though intriguing in an Orwellian,
conspiracy-theory sort of way, categorizing the type of information revealed
by GPS surveillance as extrasensory under the Court’s existing test is not
entirely plausible. In other words, if the question the Court now asks is—
could the type of information revealed by enhanced surveillance have been
obtained without enhancement?—the answer in the case of GPS tracking is
arguably yes. Though it may be exceedingly difficult (and highly improbable), one cannot reject entirely the possibility that successful twenty-four
hour surveillance of a single target might be achieved assuming an adequate
commitment of staffing and resources.
More importantly, nothing is lost by conceding, at least for the purpose
of assessing intrusiveness within the existing analytical framework, that the
type of information revealed by GPS-enhanced tracking places the technology
in the sense-augmenting category. Though constitutional protections
have rarely (if ever) been recognized in the case of such technologies, an
unduly rigid application of that rule is moderated by consideration of the
quantity or specificity of information revealed.
Where information of an admittedly unexceptional quality is nonetheless
noteworthy for its sheer volume or detail, the Supreme Court has suggested
that Fourth Amendment concerns are triggered.226 It is time to give real
meaning to this directive by recognizing that a technology classified as
sense augmenting may nonetheless be subject to constitutional oversight
when it enables the police to uncover virtual treasure troves of data. In other
words, it is the quantity of information revealed by GPS-enabled tracking,
not its type, which implicates the Constitution under current doctrine. To be

225.
226.

Id. at 744.
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986).
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sure, as the Jackson court noted, the quantity of information revealed by
GPS-enabled tracking is substantial.227
Turning to the second prong of the intrusiveness inquiry—quantity—
the Jackson court observed that “[i]n this age, vehicles are used to take
people to a vast number of places that can reveal preferences, alignments,
associations, personal ails and foibles.”228 Moreover, with the continued
advances in the technology, pinpoint monitoring of the movements of
individuals, not just their vehicles, is now possible. The technology’s
potential for giving law enforcement a detailed stream of information about
a person’s daily life, coupled with the court’s perception of the quality of
that information, led the Jackson court to find that a warrant requirement
should be placed on law enforcement’s use of GPS-enhanced tracking.229
However, although the Jackson court’s findings regarding the intrusiveness of GPS-enhanced surveillance are relevant to the Fourth Amendment
analysis, because the Jackson decision ultimately relied upon state law, it
offers little in the way of guidance.230 At the time of writing, the only two
other decisions to dispute the legality of warrantless GPS-enabled tracking
suffered a similar deficit.231
In short, what direction the Supreme Court may take on the issue is as
poorly predicted by the cases that find legal cause for concern in the
unrestricted use of GPS-enabled tracking as it is by the cases that reject
constitutional protections entirely. In fact, the one case to meaningfully
consider the enhanced intrusiveness of GPS technology under the Fourth
Amendment proves as unhelpful as the cases discussed above, because the
court, at the last minute, pulled back from its analysis and declined to
resolve the question. In United States v. Berry,232 law enforcement placed a
GPS-enabled tracking device on the defendant’s car for a period of just over
two months.233 In resolving the defendant’s motion to suppress, the district
court acknowledged that existing Supreme Court decisions did not answer
the question of whether such enhanced surveillance was a search or seizure

227.
Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223.
228.
Id.
229.
Id. at 224.
230.
The Jackson court repeatedly noted the limitations of its holding. See, e.g., id. at 222
n.1 (“Jackson does not claim or suggest in his petition for review that the Fourth Amendment
was violated. Accordingly, there is no issue before us under the Fourth Amendment.”).
231.
See supra note 206.
232.
300 F. Supp. 2d 366 (D. Md. 2004).
233.
Id. at 367.

452

55 UCLA LAW REVIEW 409 (2007)

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.234 The district court
further recognized that to the extent GPS-enabled surveillance may merit
different constitutional treatment, it is the greater intrusiveness of the
technology that will distinguish it from the beeper technology that was
considered in Knotts.235 However, given that much of the tracking in
Berry was authorized by a warrant (and that the government was willing
to forgo reliance on that portion of the tracking not so authorized), the
district court declined to decide the issue.236
B.

Treatment of GPS-Enhanced Surveillance in the Academy

The legal academy, too, has yet to find meaningful restraints within
the existing constitutional framework on law enforcement’s use of GPSenhanced surveillance. For example, several commentators who have
urged some restriction on GPS-enhanced surveillance position their analysis outside of the existing case law. In other words, they argue not that
there is a jurisprudential basis for applying the Fourth Amendment, but
rather that there ought to be, because policy considerations mandate
constitutional limits.237
I also find room for disagreement with those authors favoring law
enforcement’s unfettered use of GPS-enabled tracking. Some commentators
who endorse the unregulated use of such surveillance read Katz and Knotts
to stand for the sweeping proposition that any activities conducted in
public spaces are categorically excluded from the protections of the Fourth
Amendment.238 These arguments find their underpinnings in the concepts
of location and subjective expectation. The claim is on the one hand
grounded in a belief that the Fourth Amendment simply does not apply to

234.
Id. at 368 (“The Supreme Court’s analysis may or may not cover a GPS, which,
unlike a beeper, is a substitute for police surveillance.”).
235.
Id. (“The Supreme Court might conclude, however, that the new technology is so
intrusive that the police must obtain a court order before using it.”).
236.
Id.
237.
See, e.g., Eva M. Dowdell, You Are Here!—Mapping the Boundaries of the Fourth
Amendment With GPS Technology, 32 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 109, 137 (2005)
(concluding that “GPS defies the boundaries of established doctrines”); Mark G. Young,
Note, What Big Eyes and Ears You Have! A New Regime for Covert Governmental Surveillance,
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1021 (2001) (proposing a “fundamental rethinking” of Fourth
Amendment protections).
238.
See, e.g., John S. Ganz, Comment, It’s Already Public: Why Federal Officers Should Not
Need Warrants to Use GPS Vehicle Tracking Devices, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1325, 1337 (2005).
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public spaces.239 The other foundation for these arguments is the notion
that some portion of the information collected through the use of GPSenabled tracking is information voluntarily exposed to the public.240
Without question, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public”
is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, for that individual cannot
demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in the matter revealed.241
However, as stated in Katz, “what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
242
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”
Indeed, as the Knotts Court acknowledged, its opinion was not intended to
approve surveillance (even on the public streets) akin to a twenty-four hour
dragnet.243 While individuals understand that portions of their route may
be observed by others, it is unlikely that most people contemplate a comprehensive mapping of their whereabouts over a span of weeks or even
months, including the location of each stop and the duration of every trip
segment.244 In the case of GPS-enabled tracking, it is this aggregation of
substantial amounts of personal data that makes the limitless use of the
technology constitutionally troublesome.
As the Court has acknowledged, the collection of seemingly unexceptional
data by the government may become objectionable by virtue of its sheer
volume.245 To suggest that the unfettered use of GPS-enabled tracking is
contemplated by the Court’s decisions in Katz and Knotts ignores this critical
element of Fourth Amendment analysis. Moreover, where the sophistication of
GPS technology permits the pinpoint tracking of persons (not just vehicles),

239.
Cf. GREENHALGH, supra note 71, at 4 (concluding that the Fourth Amendment “does
not extend its protective umbrella over land in the public domain, such as streets, sidewalks,
roads, or parks”).
240.
Ganz, supra note 238, at 1337.
241.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
242.
Id. at 351–52; see also United States v. Davis, 326 F.3d 361, 365 (2d Cir. 2003).
243.
460 U.S. 276, 283–84 (1983).
244.
Commentator Stephen Henderson, advocating a “limited third party” approach to
Fourth Amendment doctrine, has observed that though a driver “conveys his or her position to
pedestrians and other drivers to avoid an accident . . . most drivers would not think they were
conveying their entire driving route to bystanders.” Henderson, supra note 103, at 547–48.
245.
Under the existing intrusiveness rubric for technologically enhanced surveillance, the
Court has arguably only once found a sense-augmenting form of surveillance to trigger Fourth
Amendment concerns based upon the quantity of information revealed. Compare Katz,
389 U.S. at 352 (imposing a warrant requirement where conversations were recorded), with
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (refusing to apply Fourth Amendment protections
where only the numbers dialed were revealed). However, the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed in
theory the notion that information that is not noteworthy for its quality may nonetheless be
constitutionally noteworthy for its sheer quantity. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States,
476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284.
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the overly broad application of Knotts allows a substantial encroachment upon
personal privacy that was clearly not envisioned by the Knotts Court.
Finally, it bears mention that some scholars in the field have argued
that the primary source of protection from intrusive technologies must
come from the U.S. Congress because adequate protections cannot be
found in a Fourth Amendment that has largely been interpreted to track
principles of property law.246 While this is an arguably plausible reading of
Fourth Amendment precedent, it is better advised to interpret the case
law to give vitality to Katz and the cases that followed it.247 While supplemental
protections can (and should) be provided by the legislative branch, the
Constitution must remain a primary and vigorous source of privacy protection.248 In other words, maximum advantage should be made of existing
case law, which is best read to extend Fourth Amendment protection to
GPS-enhanced surveillance.
C.

GPS-Enhanced Surveillance Should Be Deemed a Search Within
the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment

And so, after reviewing the decisions of the lower federal and state
courts and the available scholarship, the question still remains whether the
Constitution in any way limits law enforcement’s use of GPS-enhanced
surveillance. The answer is, in a manner of speaking, hiding in plain
sight—it can be found within the existing constitutional framework. As
discussed above,249 that two-part framework, known as the Katz test, tells
us that to determine whether constitutional protections are triggered we must
first look to whether an individual has behaved in a manner that is consistent
with a desire for privacy.250 Clearly, the facts of some cases involving GPSenhanced surveillance will more obviously lend themselves to a conclusion
in this regard than others.
For example, in Jackson, William Jackson’s decision to leave his
daughter’s body in a shallow grave near a remote logging road, and not on
246.
See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 3, at 838.
247.
See Colb, supra note 98, at 897 (observing that, historically, “because privacy tended
to correspond most closely with the ability to exclude others physically, it followed that privacy
rights would closely track (although not mirror entirely) property rights”).
248.
Cf. Amsterdam, supra note 110, at 379 (“Even if our growing crime rate and its
attendant mounting hysteria should level off, there will remain more than enough crime and fear
of it in American society to keep our legislatures from the politically suicidal undertaking of
police control.”).
249.
See supra Parts II.A.2, II.B.
250.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
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the steps of City Hall in downtown Spokane, can clearly be seen as
evidence of Jackson’s subjective desire for privacy.251 To the extent that the
Supreme Court might be asked to consider the government’s warrantless use
of GPS-enhanced surveillance under circumstances akin to those present
in Jackson, it is easy to see how a defendant might overcome the first hurdle of
Katz—demonstrating a subjective expectation of privacy. It bears mention,
though, that evidence of such evasive maneuvers, while sufficient, is
not necessary to satisfy Katz.
As some courts have noted, satisfying the first prong of Katz requires
only enough evidence to suggest that the party “acted in such a way that it
would have been reasonable for him to expect that he would not be
observed.”252 Consequently, though the Supreme Court has never directly
resolved the question, it is entirely consistent with existing precedent to
understand the level of proof required from one who challenges covert
tracking as bearing an inverse relationship to the length of time such
surveillance is conducted. For example, it is entirely reasonable to require
the proponent of suppression of an extremely brief period of GPS-enhanced
surveillance to offer some evidence of surreptitious behavior, to overcome
the acknowledged reality that when we travel in public discrete portions of
our trip are visible to those we pass.
However, as the period of targeted surveillance becomes more
protracted (as is possible with GPS-enabled tracking), a countervailing
reality must be acknowledged—that citizens of this country largely expect
the freedom to move about in relative anonymity without the government
keeping an individualized, turn-by-turn itinerary of our comings and
goings.253 In other words, I may tolerate my bank knowing where I buy
my coffee every morning. And, I may anticipate that the campus police
see my passing face every day on one of the three security cameras that
record my image. But, I do not expect that for weeks or months at a time
the various bits and pieces of my daily routine will be woven together in an
unbroken stream. In cases of protracted GPS-enhanced tracking, therefore,

251.
State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2003).
252.
United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1980).
253.
See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 103, at 547–48 (“On the one hand, a driver intentionally conveys his or her position to pedestrians and other drivers to avoid an accident. On
the other hand, most drivers would not think they were conveying their entire driving route to
bystanders, though they surely recognize the possibility that another vehicle will travel the same
route and thereby gather that information. That probability, however, decreases as the route
becomes more lengthy or complex.”).
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it would be reasonable to require little more than the defendant’s mere
assertion of an expectation of privacy to surmount the first prong of Katz.254
Moreover, as between the two prongs of Katz, it is the second—
objective reasonableness—and not the first that drives the analysis. Thus,
no matter how readily presumed by a court, my individual expectation of
privacy will not translate into constitutional protection unless that
expectation is also one that society is willing to embrace as legitimate.255
Therefore, let us turn now to consider how GPS-enhanced surveillance
might fare under the Court’s objective reasonableness prong.
Recall that the second prong of Katz requires a court to determine
whether an asserted expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable.256
Furthermore, in the case of GPS-enhanced tracking (as with all forms
of technologically enhanced surveillance), objective reasonableness will
be assessed with an eye toward the relative intrusiveness of the technology, meaning under existing doctrine the type and the quantity of
information revealed.257
Considering first the type of information revealed by GPS-enhanced
surveillance, some courts have plausibly suggested that the technology is
best categorized as extrasensory because it operates as an ultravigilant replacement for human surveillance.258 On the other hand, where GPS-enabled
surveillance relays information that at least arguably could have been
collected through intense, dragnet-like visual surveillance, it also could be
appropriately treated as sense-augmenting. Though successful around-theclock human monitoring of one or more suspects may be a near practical
impossibility, it must be conceded that it is hypothetically feasible.259 But,
the fact that precisely classifying the qualitative nature of GPS-enhance
surveillance is difficult matters not, for, given the outcome of the quantity
analysis, the constitutional result is the same whether you believe GPSenhanced surveillance to be extrasensory (and thus presumptively deserving
254.
Cf. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (accepting, at face value, the
respondent’s assertion of a “subjective intent and desire to maintain privacy as to his unlawful agricultural pursuits”).
255.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
256.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan,
J., concurring)).
257.
See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 352–53; Smith, 442 U.S. at 742, 744.
258.
United States v. Berry, 300 F. Supp. 2d 366, 368 (D. Md. 2004) (observing that GPS
surveillance could either be viewed as a high-tech “substitute for police surveillance” or simply
as a “more sophisticated beeper”); see State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (Wash. 2003).
259.
See Berry, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 368 (“A GPS merely records electronically what the
police could learn if they were willing to devote the personnel necessary to tail a car around
the clock.”).
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of constitutional protection260) or sense augmenting (and thus presumptively excluded from the constitutional definition of a search261).
To be sure, surveillance involving sense-augmenting technologies has
almost always been deemed to be outside the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection. In fact, some conflate GPS-enabled surveillance with the
beeper device addressed in Knotts. The Court’s decisions with regard to
beeper technology, however, fail to resolve the question of GPS-enabled
tracking for two related reasons. First, the Court told us that it did not.
The Knotts Court specifically advised that its decision was intended to
resolve only the question of the permissible use of the technology before
it. According to the Court, its decision should not be read to sanction
“twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country.”262 More
importantly, however, the appropriate constitutional treatment of GPSenhanced surveillance is not tied up in Knotts because, as a factual matter,
beeper and GPS technology are fundamentally different in terms of the
quantity of information revealed by the science. As discussed above, application of the general rules governing qualitative categories of technology
are moderated by consideration of the quantity or specificity of information
revealed. In other words, as with other forms of enhanced surveillance,
after GPS-enabled technology is qualitatively classified, the question of
constitutional protection turns on the quantity of information revealed
by the surveillance.
Since observing in Knotts that “a person traveling in an automobile on
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another,”263 at least one Justice of the Court has
noted (albeit in dissent) that while “plain view may be enhanced somewhat
by technology, there are limits.”264 In the case of GPS-enabled tracking,
the threshold for assessing “how much technological enhancement of ordinary perception turns mere observation into a Fourth Amendment search”
has been crossed.265
At present, the science of GPS-enabled technology is sufficiently
developed to allow law enforcement to place a tracking device in a person’s
effects or automobile and thereafter monitor their movements twenty-four
260.
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
261.
See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 750–51 (1979).
262.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (“[I]f such dragnet-type law
enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then
to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”).
263.
Id. at 281.
264.
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 416 n.6 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
265.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
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hours a day, for weeks or months at a time. Moreover, the system can
easily support multiple devices simultaneously. Assuming adequate resources
and motivation, the police could put a device in my car, on my bicycle, and
in my running shoes to ensure they knew my whereabouts no matter which
mode of transport I chose. Of equal concern, by utilizing multiple devices
against a single target, the government would also be able to discern a
wealth of information about individual choices. In other words, the
government would learn not only where I am, but what I have chosen to
take with me and what I have left behind.
The tracking information relayed to law enforcement by each device
includes the location and duration of every stop, as well as the direction and
position of travel while indoors. When interfaced with other technological
developments such as satellite photographs of specific addresses,266 or threedimensional schematics of buildings, GPS-enabled technology permits
virtual turn-by-turn, real-time monitoring of suspects over substantial periods.
There will be no possibility that a suspect might slip out anonymously on
his lunch hour to visit with his drug abuse counselor or to rendezvous
with a paramour.
Moreover, because of the passive nature of the system, the government
can easily monitor the comings and goings of an entire family or a group
of associates. Moreover, many GPS-enhanced surveillance systems retain
records that can be reviewed and compared months or even years later.
Accordingly, information about networks of people and associations can be
developed, retained, and closely analyzed. The police could conclusively
determine that every Monday I meet Diane and Kris for yoga, but on
Tuesdays, Kris goes out with Roderick and Ray, while I work late. Or, that
for the month of May, I frequently stopped by Julie’s Tattoo Parlor before
stopping at Jay and Kurt’s apartment. They could generate and compare
such records for weeks or months at a time to develop a comprehensive
digest of my friends, associates, preferences, and desires.
Under the intrusiveness inquiry that the Court has incorporated into
the objective reasonableness prong of the Katz test, the extensive database of
information collectable through the use of GPS-enabled surveillance justifies
affording some constitutional limitation on police use of the technology.
266.
For an example of the type of photographs that are currently available at no cost on the
Internet, visit Google Maps (http://maps.google.com) to search any address or neighborhood in
the country. It will provide you with a labeled (hybrid) or unlabeled (satellite) photograph
of virtually any location in the country. The image of most residences allows you to clearly
identify the residence and surrounding objects, including the type of cars parked in the driveway
and larger items left in the open, such as children’s play equipment, recycling bins, and trash cans.
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If the dog sniff exemplifies informational quantity tempering the impact
of qualitative categorization at one end of the spectrum, GPS-enabled
surveillance is the example at the other end. In other words, it is the
quantity of information revealed by GPS-enabled tracking, not its quality,
that merits defining use of the technology a search for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment.
Moreover, including GPS-enhanced surveillance within the protection
afforded by the Fourth Amendment is entirely consistent with existing
norms. The government’s unmonitored use of this technology would
fundamentally change the relationship between our government and its
citizens. If GPS-enabled tracking is deemed a nonsearch, all individuals will
be forced to assume the risk that at any moment (and at all moments) the
government may be keeping a continuous log of their whereabouts. Whether
motivated by an honest desire to ferret out criminal conduct or nothing more
than sheer curiosity, the government will be entitled to check whether we
spend our lunch hour at the gym, at the temple, or at the strip club.
Without doubt, this is not the vision of free society sanctioned by the
framers.267 Anthony Amsterdam observed that “the authors of the Bill of
Rights had known oppressive government. I believe they meant to erect
every safeguard against it. I believe they meant to guarantee to their survivors the right to live as free from every interference of government
agents as our condition would permit.”268 GPS-enabled technology, when
used with wireless transmitters and monitored by the police, fundamentally
alters this expectation of privacy in ways that are not reasonable under
our constitutional system. The Fourth Amendment mounts a defense
against such an erosion of a free society. And for this reason, the use of
GPS-enhanced technology cannot be countenanced without judicial oversight.
In our post-9/11 environment, a frequent criticism of calls for
enhanced regulation of the police is that it will unduly hamper law
enforcement, which needs fewer, not greater, restraints to effectively fight
crime and terrorism. To quote Justice Brennan commenting in a related
context, there “is the pervasive fear that if [such] surveillance were deemed
to be within the reach of the Fourth Amendment, a useful technique of
267.
See United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.) (“[T]he real evil
aimed at by the Fourth Amendment is the search itself, that invasion of a man’s privacy
which consists in rummaging about among his effects to secure evidence against him.”).
To narrowly restrict the meaning of search, therefore, or to define so loosely the contours
of its existence as to allow most things to be deemed nonsearches at the whim of individual
decisionmakers, is to gut the heart of the amendment.
268.
Amsterdam, supra note 110, at 400.
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law enforcement would be wholly destroyed.”269 This fear, however, is not
borne out by the historical record. For example, despite legislative and
judicial recognition that police use of wiretapping must be regulated, it
remains an effective tool in the law enforcement arsenal.270 Moreover, as
some members of the Court have cautioned for decades, unbounded police
conduct is not necessary for, and indeed may be inimical to, effective
law enforcement.271
In sum, the Court’s existing framework for analyzing enhanced
surveillance provides a meaningful safeguard against law enforcement’s
unfettered use of GPS-enhanced tracking. A balanced formulation of
the intrusiveness inquiry leads to the conclusion that GPS-enhanced
tracking must be deemed a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment because it is a form of technology that generates vast quantities
of detailed information about a targeted subject.
However, “[t]here is a vast conceptual difference between an
instance of the Fourth Amendment satisfied and an instance of the
Fourth Amendment inapplicable.”272 Therefore, the analysis does not
end with the conclusion that the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment
govern law enforcement’s use of GPS-enhanced surveillance. The question
next becomes what procedural safeguards are required to make official
use of the technology reasonable, and thereby constitutional.
D.

GPS-Enhanced Surveillance Should Be Preauthorized
by a Warrant

The Fourth Amendment instructs only that “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea273
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” It does not provide
specific guidance about how compliance with this mandate must be structured. However, the Court has filled that gap by equating the amendment’s
269.
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 463 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
270.
Helene Stapinski, Op-Ed., Shrugging All the Way, N.Y. T IMES, Dec. 10, 2006,
§ 14NJ, at 21 (discussing the use of a wiretap in the corruption case of Hudson County Executive
Robert Janiszewski).
271.
See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (acknowledging
that society holds a “deeply felt belief that the criminal law cannot be used as an instrument of
unfairness, and that the possibility of unfair and even brutal police tactics poses a real and
serious threat to civilized notions of justice”); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 762
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[E]ncouragement to lazy, immoral conduct by the police
does not bode well for effective law enforcement. Nor will crime be checked by such means.”).
272.
G REENHALGH, supra note 71, at 4.
273.
U.S. C ONST . amend. IV.
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mandate of reasonableness with the presumption that a warrant must
preauthorize official conduct falling within the amendment’s scope.274
275
For example, in Johnson v. United States, the Court struck down
an opium user’s multiple convictions for violations of federal narcotics
laws after the police entered and searched her hotel room without a
warrant. The Court first observed that a strong odor of burning opium
led the agents directly to the defendant’s room. Based upon this
observation, the Court acknowledged that the agents arguably possessed
probable cause to believe that criminal activity was afoot at the time of their
warrantless entry. Nonetheless, the Court held that an assessment of
whether information known to officers is sufficient to justify intruding upon a
defendant’s privacy is a decision to be made by a judicial officer, not the
police officer on the ground.
As the Court has observed, the amendment’s protections do not
“den[y] law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence.”276 Rather, the amendment requires
only “that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”277 Since Johnson, the Court has consistently
declared its preference for warrants to be the presumptive baseline.278
274.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (observing that “searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment”). However, it must be noted that the legitimacy
of the warrant requirement is the subject of considerable debate. Compare Amar, supra
note 4, at 761 (arguing that the “words of the Fourth Amendment . . . do not require
warrants, even presumptively, for searches and seizures”), with Carol S. Steiker, Second
Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. R EV . 820, 830 (1994) (arguing that “the fact
that colonial history does not support the warrant requirement does not suggest that
nothing supports it”).
275.
333 U.S. 10 (1948).
276.
Id. at 13–14.
277.
Id. at 14; see also United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) (observing
that “[s]ecurity against unlawful searches is more likely to be attained by resort to search
warrants than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers while acting
under the excitement that attends the capture of persons accused of crime”); Go-Bart Imp.
Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357–58 (1931) (finding that the warrantless search of
the defendant’s office “was a lawless invasion of the premises and a general exploratory
search in the hope that evidence of crime might be found”); Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20, 32 (1925) (“The search of a private dwelling without a warrant is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws.”).
278.
See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (“Where a search is
undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, this Court
has said that reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.” (citation
omitted)); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 617–18 (1961) (finding that the state
police’s warrantless search of the petitioner’s rented house was unconstitutional despite the
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Accordingly, once law enforcement’s use of GPS-enhanced technology
is defined as a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the warrant
presumption is triggered. And use of the technology should be deemed
unreasonable to the extent it is conducted without preauthorization by a
neutral and detached magistrate.
Admittedly, the Court since Johnson has carved out a dozen or so
“specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” to the warrant
requirement.279 To name just a few, the Court has found that the
presence of exigent circumstances, such as the hot pursuit of a fleeing felon,
will excuse a warrantless search.280 Similarly, the Court has found that
the warrantless seizure and search of an individual for the limited purposes
of briefly investigating reasonably suspicious behavior and ensuring
officer safety during such investigation are permissible.281 Exceptions to
282
the warrant requirement have also been carved out for consent searches,
283
searches conducted incident to a valid arrest, searches of automobiles,284

landlord’s express authorization of the search); cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576
(1980) (finding that the Fourth Amendment “prohibits the police from making a warrantless and
nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home in order to make a routine felony arrest”); Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (“An arrest without a warrant bypasses the safeguards provided by
an objective predetermination of probable cause.”). But see Amar, supra note 4, at 757 (criticizing
the inconsistency of Fourth Amendment law with the observation that “warrants are not
required—unless they are”).
279.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
280.
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (“[N]either the entry without warrant
to search for the robber, nor the search for him without warrant was invalid. Under the
circumstances of this case, ‘the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.’” (quoting
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948))).
281.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (“[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to
permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has
reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether
he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.”).
282.
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (defining the state’s burden for
establishing consent to search).
283.
See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (confirming that following arrest, an
officer may search the arrestee’s person and any areas within his immediate control for weapons or
destructible evidence); see also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (modifying the Chimel
rule, as applied to cars, to allow the search of the entire interior of an automobile, and any
containers—open or closed—contained therein, following the arrest of its occupants);
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004) (permitting the search of the interior of a car
under the Belton doctrine, even though the suspect was already outside of his car at the time
of arrest); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (broadening the principle of
Chimel to allow the “full search” of an arrestee’s person).
284.
See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) (finding the warrantless stop
and search of cars permissible where the police have “probable cause for believing that [the]
vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise”).
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searches of items in plain view,285 searches in heavily regulated industries,286
and “special needs” searches.287
However, in keeping with its stated preference for warrants, the Court
has been careful when creating each of these exceptions to identify a
particular motivation for excusing law enforcement’s need to secure a warrant.
For example, in the case of investigatory stops and frisks, the Court noted
that officer safety was a critical basis for the exception, and required that
any search be limited to only that exploration necessary to discover weapons.288
Similarly, with regard to the exception drafted for exigent circumstances,
the Court reasoned that such an exception was necessary because of the
dangers of evidence destruction or harm to the pursuing officers. 289
In the case of GPS-enhanced tracking, however, there is no reasoned basis
for an exception to the warrant requirement. Indeed, in those cases
where GPS-enhanced surveillance is most useful to the government,
obtaining a warrant would impose little hardship. The use of GPS-enhanced
tracking is most productive for law enforcement, and most troublesome in
constitutional terms, when it is used over extended spans of time.290 But, it is
in precisely these cases that officers, armed with the luxury of time,
have little reason not to secure the preauthorization of a warrant. Indeed, in
many cases, this is precisely what law enforcement is already doing.291
In short, absent some logical basis for extending an existing exception to
the warrant requirement (or creating a new one) to encompass GPS-enhanced
surveillance, we are back to the Court’s presumptive warrant requirement.
Therefore, to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s mandate of reasonableness, law
enforcement desirous of tracking suspects using GPS-enhanced surveillance
should first be required to obtain the authorization of a warrant.

285.
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971).
286.
See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 707–09 (1987) (finding the warrantless administrative
search of a junkyard permissible in light of the extensive regulation of the industry under state law).
287.
See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (finding that
random drug testing of public school athletes was appropriate in light of the “special needs
[that] exist in the public school context”).
288.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (“Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to
be struck in this type of case leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to
permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has
reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual . . . .”).
289.
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 302 (1973); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99
(1967). But see Saltzburg, supra note 4, at 957–58 (expressing the view that the Court has created
many exceptions to the warrant requirement that are arbitrary and unprincipled).
290.
See supra Part III.C.
291.
See, e.g., United States v. Berry, 300 F. Supp. 2d 366 (D. Md. 2004); State v. Jackson,
76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2003).
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CONCLUSION

Writing about the Fourth Amendment, Justice Stewart stated over
thirty years ago that “this basic law and the values that it represents may
appear unrealistic or ‘extravagant’ to some. But the values were those of
the authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts.”292 Contrasting
the world of the founding generation with his own, he noted, “[i]n times
not altogether unlike our own they won . . . a right of personal security
against arbitrary intrusion by official power. If times have changed . . . the
changes have made the values served by the Fourth Amendment more,
not less, important.”293 The same could be said today.
There is no question that times have changed. The world we live
in is quite different from the one inhabited by the founders (or even by
Justice Stewart). We face pressing safety concerns, as individuals and as a
society. Law enforcement, no doubt, has its work cut out for it with
terrorists and common criminals alike devising new and ever more
effective ways of harming us. But, we must ask what we will have saved if
we cede significant ground to a bunker mode of existence, retaining
only that sliver of privacy that we cannot envision a madman
exploiting. If we abandon the principles of the Fourth Amendment—
principles that the founders thought so essential they must be ensconced
in a written constitution294—we will have radically altered the country
in which we live. The country we will have saved from the terrorists
and the street thugs will be a country none of us wishes to inhabit.
Admittedly, there are substantial pressures pushing us to allow the
continued encroachment upon our privacy in the name of efficiency and
security. And, concededly, those litigants most commonly urging rigor in
our interpretation of the Fourth Amendment are often the least sympathetic champions of our Constitution. But this alone should not be a
basis for allowing the amendment to be interpreted in a fashion that
leaves us all vulnerable to the whims of law enforcement in a manner
wholly inconsistent with the amendment’s spirit. The Constitution
requires that we forego neither liberty nor security.295
292.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971).
293.
Id.
294.
Cf. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) (lauding Justice Frankfurter’s
observation in dissent in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), that the “[Fourth]
Amendment was in large part a reaction to the general warrants and warrantless searches that
had so alienated the colonists and had helped speed the movement for independence”).
295.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (“This Court’s decisions reflect
a frank recognition that the Constitution requires the sacrifice of neither security nor liberty.”).
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As Justice Frankfurter once noted, “[t]he history of liberty has largely
been the history of observance of procedural safeguards.”296 Providing such
safeguards is in no small part the function of the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, we must get past our distaste for the messenger and hear the message:
The Fourth Amendment is often the last line of defense between “we
the people” and what Justice Stewart once called the “‘well-intentioned
but mistakenly over-zealous executive officers’ who are a part of any system
of law enforcement.”297 We must take the Fourth Amendment’s mandate
seriously and jealously guard those protections that exist under it.
As demonstrated by the preceding discussion of GPS-enabled
tracking, the contour of a jurisprudence that is both protective and flexible
exists within the boundaries of current Fourth Amendment law. This
jurisprudence is relevant not just to the particular technology at issue
in this Article but also to future technological developments. Therefore, we must make the most of it. The sky is not falling—yet. But, if
we continue to allow the Court’s Fourth Amendment law to be
interpreted in a limited fashion that reads the amendment’s protections
into oblivion, George Orwell’s 1984 will become a much more likely
version of our future.
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